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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the discovery of DNA fingerprinting by British researcher 
Alec Jeffreys in 1985, forensic DNA identification has made an 
unprecedented impact on the criminal justice system.1 The first DNA-based 
conviction in the United States occurred in 1987, when a Florida court 
convicted Tommy Lee Andrews of rape after DNA tests matched his DNA 
from a blood sample with that of semen found in a rape victim.2 In 1989, 
Virginia established the first forensic DNA database in the United States, and 
                                                 
1 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING, 2 (Academic Press, 2d ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing]. 
2 Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
“genetic fingerprint” evidence was admissible). 
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by 1998 the National DNA Index System (NDIS) was operational.3 Forensic 
DNA testing has emerged as a beacon of quality among other forensic 
science fields due to the fact that forensic DNA methods are rooted in 
objective scientific principles. In an otherwise scathing report of forensic 
science by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 2009, DNA testing 
was heralded as the consummate form of forensic science done right.4 
The admissibility of DNA evidence in United States courts has seen 
its ups and down, but increasingly courts are supportive of its admission due 
to its unparalleled accuracy. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court 
recently unequivocally endorsed the value of DNA evidence, stating that 
“law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts have acknowledged DNA 
testing’s ‘unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to 
identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the 
criminal justice system and police investigative practices.’”5 Forensic DNA 
testing databases are now commonplace in criminal investigations.6 Despite 
the prolific use of forensic DNA testing in criminal investigations, DNA 
testing remains an evolving science.7 Similar to other emerging technologies, 
novel methods and applications of DNA testing need to be evaluated for both 
scientific validity and legal consequences.8 One such novel and controversial 
use of DNA databases is familial DNA searching. 
Familial DNA searching is defined as a “deliberate search of a DNA 
database conducted for the intended purpose of potentially identifying close 
biological relatives to the unknown forensic profile obtained from crime 
scene evidence.”9 Familial searching relies on the principle that biologically 
related individuals, such as siblings or parents and children, will share more 
genetic information than non-biologically related individuals. 10  The 
conviction of the first individual linked to a crime through familial DNA 
searching occurred in 2004 in the United Kingdom when defendant Craig 
Harmon pleaded guilty to manslaughter after DNA from blood found at the 
                                                 
3 BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 2. 
4 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 41(2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/open
book.php?record_id=12589&page=R1 (stating that DNA analysis has “a higher degree of 
reliability and relevance than any other forensic technique”). 
5 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013) (quoting Dist. Attorney’s 
Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009)). 
6 BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at ix (noting the numerous types 
of criminal cases that utilize DNA testing). 
7 Id. at xi (stating that “ten new chapters have been added to accommodate the 
explosion of new information”). 
8 Id. at 389. 
9 FBI Laboratory Services, Familial Searching, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov
/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) 
[hereinafter Familial Searching]. 
10 Id. 
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crime scene closely matched the DNA of Harman’s relative, who was 
registered in a DNA database.11 
This article addresses both the scientific principles and legal 
implications of familial DNA searching, using Minnesota as a case study for 
state implementation. Section II outlines the basics of forensic DNA testing, 
DNA databases, and the intricacies of familial DNA searching.12 Section III 
explores the Fourth Amendment implications of searching a DNA database 
for family members. 13  Section IV discusses the two most promising 
strategies for implementing familial DNA searching: statutory authorization 
and administrative policy. 14  Section V first argues that familial DNA 
searching is an effective and scientifically valid procedure that will withstand 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.15 Finally, Section V concludes by arguing that 
familial DNA searching should be implemented in Minnesota through 
statutory authorization, whether implicitly through the already existing DNA 
database legislation or explicitly through new legislation specific to familial 
DNA, in conjunction with a rulemaking process that is transparent to both 
the scientific and legal community, as well as the public.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A sound understanding of the basics of DNA and genetic 
inheritance, the underlying structure of DNA databases, and the technicalities 
of the familial DNA searching process is critical to a legal analysis of 
familial DNA searching. Knowledge of the science behind familial DNA 
searching will serve to remove skepticism and enable legal professionals to 
accept the constitutionality of this powerful technology. 
A.  DNA Basics 
1.  A Forensic DNA Profile 
Forensic DNA is based on the scientific fact that, with the exception 
of identical twins, each individual’s genome is unique.17 One-half of that 
genetic information comes from an individual’s father, and one-half comes 
                                                 
11 Mitch Morrissey, Familial DNA Searching: What Every Prosecutor Should 
Know About This Powerful Forensic Tool, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug./Sept. 2011, at 15 
(detailing the Craig Harmon case). 
12 See infra Part II (describing forensic DNA analysis and DNA databases). 
13 See infra Part III (discussing applicable Fourth Amendment case law). 
14 See infra Part IV (describing two methods of familial DNA searching 
implementation). 
15 See intra Part V.A–B (arguing that familial DNA searching is scientific valid 
and constitutional under the Fourth Amendment). 
16 See infra Part V.C–D (arguing that familial DNA searching should be 
conducted at the state level through open and public policy or statute). 
17 BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 26 (discussing the area of the 
genome that make individuals unique). 
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from an individual’s mother.18 However, deciphering each individual’s entire 
genome for forensic DNA testing is not feasible or practical.19 Therefore, 
forensic DNA profiling only tests a small subset of an individual’s DNA in 
order to differentiate between individuals for identity purposes.20 Forensic 
DNA markers, which are selected based upon their propensity to differentiate 
between two people and their lack of phenotypic characteristics, can be 
isolated in small subsets of DNA and are used for identification and 
matching purposes.21 
The most common type of DNA testing performed today, and the 
type that is used universally in the United States is short tandem repeat 
(STR) testing.22 STRs are small segments of DNA that are repeated over and 
over in a specific area, or locus, that is being analyzed.23 A DNA profile is 
developed based on the variation in the number of repeats.24 The number of 
repeats is designated as an allele.25 For instance, at one locus, an individual 
might have allele 15 from his or her father and allele 17 from his or her 
mother. At another locus, alleles 8 and 9 might be present. This series of 
numbers makes up an individual’s forensic DNA profile, which can be 
compared to a DNA profile obtained using biological evidence collected 
from a crime scene.26 Forensic testing in the United States currently requires 
analysis of a minimum of thirteen different areas of an individual’s 
genome.27 The frequency of each allele in the population allows a statistical 
estimate to be made regarding the frequency of that entire DNA profile in the 
population. 28  A random match probability between an evidence-derived 
DNA profile and a DNA profile from a known individual can then be 
calculated and reported to law enforcement.29 
                                                 
18 Id. at 17. 
19 Id. at 21 (noting that the Human Genome Project took fifteen years to 
complete). 
20 Id. at 26 (describing the areas of the genome that are appropriate for genetic 
identity purposes). 
21 Id. at 88 (explaining the desirable characteristics of STRs used in forensic 
DNA typing). Phenotypic characteristics are those that are physically observable, such as eye 
color. Current DNA testing markers do not look at genes. See JOHN M. BUTLER, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING, 6 (Academic Press, 2009). 
22 See BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 94. (describing how the 
U.S. established STRs as the method of forensic DNA testing in 1997 to ensure that all states 
would be “talking the same language.”) Because of the universal use of the STR system, 
comparisons can be made between any two pieces of forensic DNA evidence recovered from 
any crime scene throughout the U.S. Id. at 90. 
23 Id. at 87 (describing the characteristics of STRs). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 23 (defining “allele”). 
26 Id. 
27 See BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing the thirteen 
CODIS loci selected by the FBI sponsored STR Project). 
28 Id. at 498 (explaining DNA profile frequency estimate calculations). 
29 Id. at 497 (defining random match probability as a probability based on 
frequency genotype estimates). 
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2.  YSTR Testing 
A second type of forensic DNA testing—Y-chromosome STR 
(YSTR)—is also widely used by forensic scientists.30 Traditional autosomal 
STR markers are shuffled around between each generation so that a father 
and son will not have the same genetic profile.31 In contrast, Y-chromosome 
markers, commonly called “lineage markers,” are passed down from 
generation to generation without changing.32 YSTR testing looks at STR 
markers that are only present on the Y-chromosome, and for this reason, only 
male individuals will have a YSTR profile.33 A father and son will have the 
same YSTR profile, as will two brothers who have the same father.34 
Because of this method of inheritance, an obvious limitation to 
YSTR testing is that the YSTR profile of a male individual is not unique.35 
As with most scientific principles, a limitation in one application can be an 
advantage in another application. Familial DNA searching relies precisely on 
this paternal inheritance to confirm the familial relationship between two 
individuals who may be linked in a traditional STR familial search.36 Section 
B, infra, discusses the practice of using YSTR testing in familial DNA 
searching.37 
B.  An Overview of Forensic DNA Databases and Mechanics 
Once a DNA profile is derived from a piece of forensic evidence 
collected from a crime scene, identifying the individual genetically matched 
to the sample often becomes the central focus of the investigation. 38 
Sometimes, law enforcement officials may have suspects already identified. 
More often, however, the case is considered a non-suspect case, meaning law 
enforcement officials have not identified specific suspects or persons-of-
interest in the case.39 In non-suspect cases, DNA evidence can be used to 
identify potential suspects by running the evidence-derived DNA profile 
against profiles in an existing DNA database and getting a “cold hit.”40 A 
                                                 
30 JOHN M. BUTLER, ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING: 
METHODOLOGY, 371 (Academic Press, 2012) [hereinafter BUTLER, Advanced Topics]. 
31 Id. Autosomal markers are genetic markers that are not located on the sex 
determining chromosomes, X and Y. Id. 
32 Id. (noting the exception for mutational events). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 373. 
35 Id. (discussing the paternal inheritance of the male Y chromosome). 
36 BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 607 (noting the use of YSTRs to 
increase the success rates of familial DNA searching). 
37 See infra Part II.B.4. 
38 See BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 213. 
39 Id. at 214. 
40 Best Practices for Handling “Cold Hits”, FORENSIC DNA EDUC. FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKERS (last visited Apr. 28, 2015), http://projects.nfstc.
org/fse/10/10-02.html. A DNA cold hit refers to an instance where one or more connections 
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DNA database may contain DNA profiles from convicted offenders, 
individuals arrested for crimes, unknown DNA profiles obtained from crime 
scene evidence, and DNA profiles obtained from unidentified human 
remains.41 The vast amount of DNA profiles available in the DNA database 
help police efficiently and accurately identify suspects.42 
1.  CODIS Structure 
In order to effectively take advantage of the availability of DNA 
profiles, a national database called CODIS ensures that forensic DNA 
profiles from all United States jurisdictions can be cross-referenced against 
each other.43 CODIS is an acronym for “Combined DNA Index System” and 
is a generic term that refers to both the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) program for criminal justice DNA databases as well as the software 
used to manage these databases.44 CODIS is comprised of local, state, and 
national databases.45 In Local DNA Index Systems (LDISs), DNA profiles 
can be entered and searched against other profiles from local cases.46 In 
addition, each participating state has a single laboratory that operates and 
maintains a State DNA Index System (SDIS). 47  DNA profiles and 
information can be searched against other DNA profiles within the same 
state at the SDIS level.48 Each state also has its own statute that regulates 
what types of samples are required to be collected and submitted to the 
database.49 
The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is the top level of CODIS, 
and it contains DNA profiles contributed by all federal, state, and local 
participating forensic laboratories. 50  NDIS operates as a central hub and 
allows states to share DNA profiles. 51  By designating and requiring the 
determination of thirteen core loci, or areas tested, CODIS ensures that all 
states use the same terminology and collect DNA profiles that are 
                                                                                                                   
are made between a perpetrator and a crime scene in the absence of a current investigative 
lead. Id. (citing the DNA.gov definition of “cold hit”). 
41 See BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 224 (discussing the different 
CODIS indices). The content of each state or federal database is determined by statute. Id. 
42 See id. at 435 (stating that DNA databases have revolutionized the ability to 
link crime scene evidence to perpetrators). 
43 Id. at 438 (describing the structure of CODIS). 
44 FBI Laboratory Services, CODIS Brochure, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Forensic Science Laws Database, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/dna-laws-database.
aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (repository for the DNA database legislation by state). 
50 See CODIS Brochure, supra note 44. 
51 Id. 
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comparable for matching purposes.52 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 
authorized the creation of NDIS and specifies what types of samples may be 
maintained at NDIS and the requirements for participating laboratories 
relating to quality assurance, privacy, and expungement. 53  NDIS was 
implemented in October 1998 and currently, all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government participate in NDIS. 54  As of 
December 2014, NDIS contained the profiles of over 11,000,000 offenders, 
approximately 1,300,000 arrestees, and 602,000 forensic casework profiles.55 
These DNA databases were designed primarily to identify unknown crime 
scene samples by comparing evidence-derived DNA profiles to the DNA 
profiles in the database and discovering a “hit,” or a direct match, at all 13 
loci.56 
2.  Database Match Criteria 
In order to evaluate the legal implications of familial DNA 
searching, it is important to understand the intricacies of the CODIS software 
and how different types of matches are identified. The CODIS software 
allows for searching at three different levels of stringency: high, moderate, 
and low.57 A high stringency search requires an exact match of both alleles at 
each of the 13 loci searched.58  Moderate stringency searches require all 
alleles to match, but the target and candidate profiles may contain a different 
number of alleles. 59  Moderate stringency matches cannot have any 
mismatches, unlike low stringency searches. 60  Low stringency searches 
produce a match when at least one allele matches at each locus, even though 
the casework profile has an additional allele not in the offender profile, or 
                                                 
52 BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that in order for 
DNA testing to be effective, standardized markers must be used). 
53 DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §14132 (1994) For example, the 
statute allows the maintenance of DNA samples of convicted offenders, casework samples, 
and missing persons. 
54 FAQs on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI.GOV, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet 
[hereinafter CODIS FAQs] (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
55 CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). Interestingly, state DNA databases 
were established prior to the implementation of NDIS. See also BUTLER, Forensic DNA 
Typing supra note 1, at 2 (noting that in 1989 Virginia required felons convicted of a serious 
crime to submit samples for DNA testing); Supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating that 
the national DNA database was implemented in 1998). 
56 Id. 
57 See FBI LABORATORY SERVICES, NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, VERSION 3, at 31 (Jan. 1, 2015) (Table 1) [hereinafter 
NDIS Procedures Manual], available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/
codis/ndis-procedures-manual. 
58 CODIS FAQs, supra note 54. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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vice versa.61 While low-stringency matches are conducted at the SDIS and 
LDIS levels, they are not conducted at the NDIS level.62 
 
Table 1. Examples of different match stringencies possible in the CODIS 
software.63 
 
Locus  Casework Profile Offender Profile Match Stringency 
A 13 13, 14 Moderate 
B 28, 31.2 28, 31.2 High 
C 10, 12 10 Moderate 
D 17 15, 17 Moderate 
E 24, 25 24, 25 High 
F 8, 9 8, 10 Low 
 
NDIS conducts moderate stringency searches.64 Moderate stringency 
CODIS searches were implemented because forensic science laboratories 
realized that crime scene profiles are often partially degraded and/or contain 
DNA from more than one contributor.65 DNA degradation occurs when the 
DNA source is subject to environmental conditions, such as heat and 
humidity, or it may simply occur due to the age of the sample. 66 A degraded 
DNA profile might not contain all of the genetic information in the profile.67 
This moderate stringency search enables the scientist conducting the search 
to “stumble upon” a possible familial association due to the number of alleles 
shared between the forensic casework profile and the convicted offender 
profile. 68  These fortuitous matches have important implications in 
developing familial DNA searching policies.69 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 LDIS and SDIS databases contain fewer DNA profiles and therefore, lower 
stringency searches are possible, but not often conducted. Each state maintains its own 
procedures for searching DNA profiles at the state and local levels. A DNA profile may be 
searched at low-stringency if the scientist believes that not all of the genetic information is 
present in the DNA profile. This can sometimes occur with aged bones, for example. 
63 Table amended from CODIS FAQs, supra note 54. 
64 NDIS Procedures Manual, supra note 57. 
65 CODIS FAQs, supra note 54. A DNA mixture is the presence of DNA from 
more than one individual in a crime scene sample. More than two alleles present at a locus is 
indicative of a forensic DNA mixture. 
66 BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 31. 
67 Id. (discussing the appearance of degraded DNA). 
68 Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 769 (2011). 
69 See infra Part IV (describing the considerations for developing familial DNA 
searching policies). 
9
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3.  Fortuitous vs. Intended Partial Matches 
Familial searching is a deliberate search of a DNA database 
conducted for the intended purpose of identifying a close biological relative 
of the unknown forensic profile.70 Familial DNA searching is often used 
synonymously with “partial match;” however, it is better understood as a 
type of partial match.71 Partial matches are discovered either fortuitously or 
deliberately.72 Deliberate partial matches are the product of an intentional 
familial search. 73  Fortuitous partial matches are not intended, but 
nevertheless may implicate the same constitutional concerns.74  Fortuitous 
partial matches are the product of a lower-stringency search in the CODIS 
database.75 Although the result is the same—potentially identifying a relative 
of an offender in the database—the distinction of whether the search was 
intended seems to factor into state policy due to the reluctance of states to 
officially announce that they are conducting familial DNA searching.76 
The myriad of confusing, incomplete, and varying policies regarding 
the use of familial DNA searches is an unfortunate effect of this 
unwillingness of states to fully confront the issue of familial DNA testing. A 
comprehensive 2010 survey of state partial matching policies uncovered 
startling statistics relating to laboratory procedures and protocols.77 Of the 47 
states surveyed, 19 have approved or reported fortuitous partial matches of 
familial DNA, while 14 of these states will not conduct deliberate familial 
searches. 78  Ten states have policies that expressly preclude a deliberate 
search, but permit reporting on a fortuitous partial match.79 Significantly, 
                                                 
70 Recommendations from the SWGDAM Ad Hoc Working Group on Familial 
Searching, SWGAM, 1 (2013), http://swgdam.org/SWGDAM%20Recs%20on%20Fami
lial%20Searching%20APPROVED%2010072013.pdf [hereinafter Recommendations]. The 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, known as SWGDAM, serves as a 
forum to discuss, share, and evaluate forensic biology methods, protocols, training, and 
research to enhance forensic biology services as well as provide recommendations to the FBI 
Director on quality assurance standards for forensic DNA analysis. See infra text 
accompanying note 124 (describing the formation of the SWGDAM Adhoc Working Group 
on Familial DNA Searching). 
71 A partial match is a match that has some, but not all alleles matching between 
the evidence-derived DNA profile and a profile in the database. 
72 Ram, supra note 68 at 753. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (noting that the information uncovered by both fortuitous and deliberate 
searches is functionally similar). 
75 See Familial Searching, supra note 9 (explaining that a partial match is 
identified by the number of alleles shared between the two profiles when conducting a search). 
76 See Tom Olsen, Duluth police crack 1981 cold case, credit DNA technology, 
TWINCITIES.COM—PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.twincities.com/localnews
/ci_27447861/duluth-police-crack-1981-cold-case-credit-dna. Notably, this article does not 
mention the words familial DNA searching, even though it was used to identify the suspect in 
this case. Id. 
77 Ram, supra note 68. 
78 Id. at 768–69. 
79 Id. at 769. 
10
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what is done and what is expressly permitted or prohibited are two separate 
inquiries. Furthermore, laboratories make the distinction between deliberate 
and fortuitous matches to “game the system.”80 Laboratories take advantage 
of the crime-solving potential of partial match searching without dealing 
with the political fallout by expressly stating that they are conducting 
“familial DNA searching.”81 
Unfortunately, the FBI supports this contradiction. Familial 
searching is not being done at the National DNA Index System (NDIS), yet 
the FBI facilitates sharing of information between states that develop an 
association through fortuitous partial matches at NDIS.82 “Familial searching 
is often confused with what occurs when a partial match results from the 
routine search of the DNA database. A partial match is the spontaneous 
product of a regular database search.”83 Every time a scientist conducts a 
moderate or low stringency search, there is a risk of developing a partial 
match, whether or not the intention was present.84 
4.  Evaluating the Results of Familial DNA Searches: Refining the 
Investigative Lead 
Opponents of familial DNA searching, perhaps skeptical about the 
accuracy of familial DNA searching and the procedures used to implement it, 
argue that it is not effective and will lead to unwarranted investigations of 
innocent individuals. 85  In fact, the effectiveness of a familial searching 
method can be evaluated by its ability to distinguish true first-degree 
relatives from individuals exhibiting similar genetic profiles by chance 
alone.86 For example, full siblings may not share any alleles at a given locus, 
yet two unrelated individuals might share the same alleles by chance alone.87 
Two primary methods have been utilized to evaluate the familial 
associations between two profiles that do not match but have a number of 
                                                 
80 See Id. at 808 (noting that laboratories may use this distinction in order to avoid 
public controversy while benefitting from the rewards of partial matching) 
81 Olsen, supra note 76. 
82 See SWGDAM Recommendations to the FBI Director on the “Interim Plan for 
the Release of Information in the Event of a ‘Partial Match’ at NDIS”, 11 FORENSIC SCI. 
COMM., Oct. 2009, at no. 4, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/oct2009/standard_guidlines/swgdam.html (outlining procedures for states 
to conduct lower stringency searches to develop partial matches). 
83 Familial Searching, supra note 9 (emphasis added) (making the distinction 
between partial matches that happen accidentally and deliberate familial searching). 
84 CODIS FAQs, supra note 54. 
85 See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010) (arguing against the practice of familial searching due to claims 
related to equality, accuracy, and discrimination). 
86 See Recommendations, supra note 70, at 2 (Recommendation 1.1). 
87 Bruce S. Weir et al., Genetic relatedness analysis: modern data and new 
challenges, 7 NATURE REV. GENETICS 771 (2006). 
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shared alleles: counting shared alleles and a kinship likelihood ratio.88 The 
simpler, but less effective method is to determine the degree of relatedness 
by counting the number of shared alleles between the two profiles.89 This 
method is less predictive of true familial associations because it fails to take 
into account the population frequency of those alleles.90 For instance, if two 
profiles share an 8 allele at a locus, the association is certainly more 
significant if that 8 allele only occurs in 1% of the population versus if it 
occurs in 99% of the population.91 Therefore, even though related individuals 
share more DNA than unrelated individuals, partial matches exist between 
unrelated individuals, especially if the DNA profile from the crime scene 
includes alleles that are highly prevalent in the population.92 
The kinship likelihood ratio is more effective than counting shared 
alleles because it considers not only the number of alleles common to both 
profiles, but also the population frequencies of those alleles. 93  Kinship 
likelihood ratio is the comparison of the “joint probabilities of the forensic 
and offender profiles given that the donors are related . . . versus [that] they 
are unrelated.”94 Kinship likelihood ratios are represented as a continuum. 
The likelihood ratio determines whether it is very likely that the two 
individuals are related or whether there is very little probability that the two 
individuals are related.95 The numerical associations developed between the 
crime scene sample and the database profiles establish a “ranking” of 
potential relatives.96 Because an unrelated individual might, by chance, share 
more alleles than a related individual, this ranking list is only the first step in 
assessing the familial relationship between the crime scene sample and the 
identified samples in the database.97 For example, in a simulated database of 
2,130,000 profiles, there was only a 1 in 5 chance that a first-degree relative 
was ranked number one.98 
                                                 
88 Recommendations, supra note 70, at 8 (discussing the two different statistical 
models for conducing familial DNA searching). 
89 See BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 605 (noting that the likelihood 
calculation is more informative than counting alleles because it incorporates the frequencies of 
those alleles). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (explaining how common alleles will have a greater chance of being shared 
by chance alone rather than due to inheritance). 
92 Id. 
93 See Recommendations, supra note 70, at 2 (Recommendation 1.1). 
94 Jianye Ge & Bruce Budowle, Kinship Index Variations among Populations and 
Thresholds for Familial Searching, 7 PLOS ONE e37474, available at http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3353921/. 
95 Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 
312 SCIENCE 1315, 1315 (2006) (describing the use of the likelihood ratio in familial DNA 
searching). 
96 See Recommendations, supra note 70, at 9 (explaining the rankings that are 
developed after a familial DNA search in a simulated study). 
97 Id. at 11 (describing the process through which the ranking list is refined). 
98 Id. 
12
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/4
2015] FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING IN MINNESOTA 479 
This ranking list can be further refined to reduce the number of false 
positives.99 Y-chromosome testing is the most common method employed at 
this stage in the process.100 Because first-degree male relatives (fathers and 
sons or brothers) share the same YSTR profile, testing of the crime scene 
sample and the profiles in the ranked list allows the laboratory to confirm or 
refute the purported association developed during the autosomal DNA 
search. 101  YSTR testing eliminates 99% of those not related by male 
lineage.102 The United Kingdom uses the geographic location of the crime 
and the offender, as well as the age and ethnicity of the offender, to further 
distill the ranking list.103 Regardless of the analysis and refinement methods, 
initial matching results of familial DNA searches always require some 
additional aspect of scrutiny and evaluation to maximize accuracy. 
C.  Putting Familial DNA Testing Into Practice 
Despite its limited formal use in the United States, familial DNA 
searching has already seen some high profile successes. The most infamous 
successful use of familial DNA to date in the United States, the “Grim 
Sleeper” case, occurred in California. 104  A serial killer whose killings 
spanned two decades was finally identified through familial DNA searching 
in 2009.105 His son had recently been entered into the California convicted 
offender database and subsequent testing showed that the two individuals 
shared the same YSTR profile.106 Familial DNA searching solved another 
California case involving criminal sexual conduct of a woman outside a 
Santa Cruz coffee shop in 2008.107 The perpetrator’s DNA profile did not 
match anyone in the DNA database directly, but a familial DNA search led 
to a partial match with a man later identified as the perpetrator’s father.108 In 
2015, a successful familial DNA search solved a Minnesota cold-case 
homicide from 1981.109 A partial match was made between the DNA profile 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 See Bieber, supra note 95, at 1315 (explaining YSTR analysis as a way to 
narrow the familial DNA ranking list). 
101 See Recommendations, supra note 70, at 7 (stating that YSTR analysis can 
limit the number of false positives in a familial DNA search). 
102 Id. 
103 C.N. Maguire et al., Familial Searching: A Specialist Forensic DNA Profiling 
Service Utilizing the National DNA Database® to Identify Unknown Offenders via Their 
Relatives—The UK Experience, 8 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 1, 8 (2014) (describing the 
multi-step process in familial DNA searching conducted in the United Kingdom). 
104 Michael Chamberlain, Familial DNA Searching, 27-SPG CRIM. JUST. 18, 28 
(2012) (describing the details of the “Grim Sleeper” case). 
105 Id. at 29. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Olsen, supra note 76. 
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from the crime scene and the perpetrator’s son, who years later entered the 
Minnesota database.110 
Because familial DNA searching is still relatively underused in the 
United States, the potential benefits of this type of searching strategy might 
be more appropriately gauged by examining its successful use outside the 
United States. The United Kingdom has the most prolific familial DNA 
searching program of any country. 111  From 2002 to 2011 the United 
Kingdom utilized familial DNA searching in 188 cases.112 In the United 
Kingdom, familial DNA searching is used in serious crime cases or in ‘cold 
case’ reviews when there are few or no investigative leads, and has led to the 
identification of 41 perpetrators or suspects.113 The United Kingdom program 
is based on five basic principles: 
 
(1) the DNA profiles of relatives exhibit a greater degree of 
similarity than unrelated individuals; 
(2) family members of an offender are more likely to be 
involved in offending behavior; 
(3) family members tend to reside within a certain 
geographic area; 
(4) family dispersion is positively correlated with higher 
income and higher education; and 
(5) offenders tend to commit crimes where they live.114 
 
These principles bring to light the sociologic implications of familial DNA 
searching that have caused some to voice strong opposition to the process, 
but they are rooted in fact.115 For example, statistics indicate that individuals 
who commit crime are likely to have a relative who has committed crimes.116 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ report on inmates, “an 
estimated 46% of jail inmates in 2002 had a family member who had been 
incarcerated in a prison or jail.117 About 31% had a brother; 19% a father; 9% 
a sister; and 7% a mother who had been incarcerated.”118 If these statistics 
are representative of the current databases, there will be a close relative in 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 606 (stating that the United 
Kingdom has had the most experience so far with familial DNA searching). 
112 Maguire, supra note 103, at 1 (summarizing the use of familial DNA searching 
in the United Kingdom). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2 (describing the familial DNA approach in the United Kingdom). 
115 Id. 
116 DORIS J. JAMES, U.S BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PROFILE 
OF JAIL INMATES 2002, at 10 (July 2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/conten
t/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
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the database approximately half of the time.119 Familial DNA searching is 
not itself a racially or socioeconomically disparate endeavor. 120  While 
familial searching results may yield a disproportionate selection from 
individual families, the disproportion already exists in DNA databases and is 
not due to the science of familial DNA searching.121 
Leading scientific groups have evaluated the effectiveness of 
familial DNA searching at both the national and state level. During the 112th 
Congressional Session, Congressman Schiff introduced a bill entitled 
“Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2011” that would 
have required the United States Attorney General to implement policies and 
procedures for the FBI to conduct familial searches.122 While this bill was 
not enacted, the Conference Report for the 2012 Federal Fiscal Year 
Appropriations Bill contained the following statements: “[t]he conferees 
encourage the FBI to undertake activities to facilitate familial DNA searches 
of the Combined DNA Index System . . . [t]he procedures should provide 
appropriate protections for the privacy rights of those in the NDIS 
database.”123 In response to this recommendation, the Scientific Working 
Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) formed the Familial 
Searching Ad Hoc Working Group (hereinafter, Working Group) to address 
the feasibility of familial DNA searching at the national level.124 
In 2013, the Working Group published its findings and 
recommendations, concluding that performing routine familial searching at 
the national level is not advisable at this time for four main reasons.125 First, 
the inordinate number of profiles that reside in the national database makes 
familial DNA searches labor intensive and adequate refinement of results 
impracticable.126 As the size of a database increases, the more likely it will be 
that false positive associations are developed in lower stringency searches, 
such as those involving mixtures and familial associations.127 Second, the 
                                                 
119 Recommendations, supra note 70, at 9. 
120 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING FOR 
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES: ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION (2012), available at 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Familial_DNA/An%20Introduction%20to%20Fa
milial%20DNA%20Searching%20Issues%20for%20Consideration_compliant0.pdf (noting 
that because the search is only based on genetic markers it actually “reduces the risk of racial 
profiling, as the search cannot detect race, only possible family members”). 
121 Id. 
122 Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act, H.R. 3361, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
123 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2112, 112th Cong., 1st Session, 
November 14, 2011, H. Rept. 112–284, 238 (2011). See also infra note 236 (discussing the 
details of the Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2011). 
124 See Recommendations, supra note 70 (describing the goals and authority of 
SWGDAM). 
125 Id. at 3. 
126 Id. at 2–3 (noting that the national DNA database contains over 10 million 
offender profiles). 
127 Id. at 11. 
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additional filters of metadata, such as age, population group, and geography 
are not available at the national level because this information is not stored at 
NDIS.128 Only the following information is stored at the national level: (1) 
the DNA profile; (2) the agency identifier; (3) the specimen identification 
number; and (4) the DNA laboratory personnel associated with a DNA 
profile analysis.129 No names or other personal identifiers of the offenders are 
stored.130 Third, the availability of YSTR testing varies from state to state, 
resulting in a disparate treatment of the ranking lists depending on state.131 
Finally, not every state has the legal authority to conduct familial DNA 
searching.132 
The Working Group also conducted data simulations to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different size databases in ranking familial associations.133 In 
the smallest database size that was tested, the Wyoming state database that 
contained 19,300 profiles, a full sibling was identified in the number one 
ranked position 56.8% of the time.134 By contrast, California’s database, with 
1,780,000 profiles, identified a full sibling in the number one ranked position 
approximately 22.8% of the time.135  Experience has shown that the vast 
majority of traditional DNA hits occur during state level searches rather than 
at the national level.136 
The national DNA database has been in use for only 15 years, and 
experts expect that familial DNA searching will become more effective as 
DNA databases age. 137  As time passes, the number of relatives in the 
database will increase as children of previous offenders are included. 138 
Currently, the largest demographic of individuals in prison are 20 to 45 years 
of age.139 Since this range spans approximately a generation, it is more likely 
that a sibling relationship exists among current DNA profiles in the database, 
as opposed to a parent-child relationship.140 However, siblings share fewer 
alleles than a parent-child pair, and are therefore harder to identify accurately 
                                                 
128 Id. at 3. 
129 CODIS FAQs, supra note 54 (listing the information that is associated with a 
DNA profile in the national database). 
130 Id. 
131 Recommendations, supra note 70, at 3. 
132 Id. at 12 (noting the jurisdictional issues relating to the legal authority to 
perform familial searching and the impact on the scientific implementation of familial 
searching at the national level). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 10 (data obtained from Table 1 in Recommendations). 
135 Id. 
136 BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 232 (noting that 87% of DNA 
database hits occur within a state). 
137 Id. at 608 (discussing the implications of the age of DNA databases on familial 
DNA searching). 
138 Id. Of note, in the Grim Sleeper case, the newly added profile of the son into 
the database helped identify his father’s crimes from years earlier. See supra note 104. 
139 BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30, at 608. 
140 Id. 
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via a familial search.141  However, as DNA databases age, familial DNA 
searching will become more effective at identifying the individual who left 
the crime scene sample because more parent-child relationships will be 
included in the database.142 Despite the fact that familial DNA searches have 
already proven useful in criminal investigations and have the potential to 
become even more useful in the future, national and state governments are 
hesitant to implement schemes mandating use of familial DNA.143 
III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS IN FAMILIAL 
DNA SEARCHING 
The concerns of the national and state legislatures, with regard to 
allowing familial DNA searching, stem from potential constitutional 
implications. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides a right “of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 144  A Fourth 
Amendment challenge to familial DNA searching is comprised of three 
discrete issues: (1) whether the confronted action constitutes a search or 
seizure; (2) whether the individual challenging the Fourth Amendment 
violation has standing to do so; and, if so, (3) whether the search or seizure is 
“reasonable.”145 Familial DNA searching undoubtedly possesses intricacies 
not yet encountered in Fourth Amendment legal precedent.146 However, a 
Fourth Amendment analysis requires a deep understanding of the technical 
process involved in the searching procedure, in addition to an understanding 
of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and an ability to accurately 
define the numerous interests at stake when a familial search is conducted. 
                                                 
141 Id. at 609 (noting that as DNA databases age, they will begin to include the 
offspring of former offenders). 
142 Id. 
143 See infra Part IV (discussing the lack of federal or state familial DNA policies 
and statutes). 
144 U.S. Const. amend. IV, § 2. 
145 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that an individual who asserted 
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the 
property seized, and who failed to show that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy, 
was not entitled to challenge the search of those areas). 
146 See Murphy, supra note 85 at 332 (noting that analyzing familial DNA 
searching under the Fourth Amendment presents “difficult doctrinal challenges”). 
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A.  Is a Familial DNA Search a Search? 
1.  Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
A Fourth Amendment right depends on whether the claim challenges 
conduct that constitutes a search or a seizure.147 In the landmark search and 
seizure case of Katz v. United States, the Court redefined a search in terms of 
a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 148  In Katz, the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protections shifted from protecting places to protecting 
people.149 Katz opened an array of protections not contemplated before. No 
longer was a Fourth Amendment search based on trespassory elements, but 
rather, the Constitution protected the types of things the individual seeks to 
protect as private.150 In order to implicate the Fourth Amendment, the person 
must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or thing to be 
searched and society must be ready to accept this expectation as 
reasonable.151 
In Kyllo v. United States, a case with parallels to familial DNA 
searching, the Supreme Court held that an actual physical intrusion was not 
necessary to constitute a search, specifically when using technology that “is 
not in general public use.”152 The majority in Kyllo stated that “[i]t would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”153 
The Court attempted to essentially “update” Katz to align with modern 
technology by stating, “[t]he question we confront today is what limits there 
are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy.” 154  This acknowledgement of the interplay of technology and 
privacy rights has made Kyllo an applicable Supreme Court precedent to 
familial DNA searching. 
In addressing the application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to 
some 21st Century technological issues, the Supreme Court has revived the 
trespass doctrine and emphasized the purpose of law enforcement when 
conducting the “search.”155 When Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                 
147 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (“A search compromises the 
individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her 
person or property.”) 
148 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
149 Id. at 351. 
150 Id. 
151 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361(Harlan, J., concurring). 
152 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). The police used a thermal-
imaging device from a public street to obtain details about the inside of a private residence. Id. 
at 29–30. 
153 Id. at 33–34. 
154 Id. at 34. 
155 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, (2012) (holding that attachment 
of Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to vehicle, and subsequent use of that 
device to monitor vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a search within meaning of the 
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doctrine was formulated, the concept of DNA was in its infancy, having just 
been discovered by Watson and Crick in 1953.156 DNA’s use in criminal 
cases was still three decades away. 157  However, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines provide clues as 
to how the Court may decide a familial DNA search case in the context of 
defining whether it constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 158 
In Jones, the Court held that attachment of a Global-Positioning-
System (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device 
to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets constituted a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.159 In Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion, the Court stated that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test.”160 The majority did not answer the reasonable expectation of privacy 
question and instead relied solely on the trespass nature of the police 
action. 161  This focus was the cause for much consternation among the 
concurring justices, and the concurring opinions in Jones are worthy of close 
examination.162 
The concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor suggests that the 
trespass/Katz distinction that the Court proposed would raise conflicts in 
cases where the same information may be obtained through either electronic 
or visual surveillance. 163  The visual surveillance would be deemed 
constitutional, whereas the electronic surveillance (GPS tracking) would be 
deemed unconstitutional.164 Scalia responded by indicating that “[i]t may be 
that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an 
accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy . . . .”165 In 
her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor, quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 
pointed to what could arguably be the heart of the issue in Jones: “because 
                                                                                                                   
Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18(2013) (holding that law 
enforcement officers’ use of drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of home to investigate an 
unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home, was a trespassory invasion of the 
curtilage which constituted a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that officers did 
not have an implied license for the physical invasion of the curtilage). 
156 BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 1, at 20. 
157 See supra note 2 (noting that the first DNA-based conviction in the United 
States occurred in 1987). 
158 See David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of 
“Familial Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 133 (2013) (discussing how Jones and 
Jardines may be applicable to familial DNA searching). 
159 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946. 
160 Id. at 952. 
161 Id. at 946 (stating that the Government’s physical intrusion on an “effect” for 
the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search” in this case). 
162 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–63 (Sotomayor, J. & Alito, J., concurring). 
163 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the majority 
opinion may provide little guidance in cases of electronic or novel modes of surveillance 
without a physical invasion on property). 
164 Id. 
165 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (emphasis added). 
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GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance 
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police 
resources and community hostility.’”166 Perhaps foreshadowing her approach 
in a future case considering a type of procedure like familial DNA searching, 
Sotomayor also stated that she would “consider the appropriateness of 
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a 
coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the 
Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power.”167 
Justice Sotomayor was concerned with the use of new and discrete law 
enforcement methodologies that might escape the legislative process.168 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, 
echoed the concerns of Justice Sotomayor, suggesting that Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is subject to complications in the ever-advancing 
technological society.169 In ascertaining the “subjective” element of Katz, he 
noted that “the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical 
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy 
expectations.”170  Justice Alito contends that new technology may change 
those privacy expectations and society’s attitudes to what they are willing to 
give up in exchange for increased security and convenience. 171  Alito’s 
concern for the changing expectations of privacy in an increasingly 
technological society seems to indicate that when assessing the 
constitutionality of familial DNA searching, courts should balance the 
privacy expectation in an individual’s DNA profile with the desire for 
increased security brought by solving crimes. 
However, in 2013 Justice Scalia and a majority of the court again 
relied on the common-law trespass rule to decide Florida v. Jardines.172 The 
majority opinion held that law enforcement officers’ use of a drug-sniffing 
dog on the front porch of a home was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage 
which constituted a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.173 The Court 
also held that the officers did not have an implied license for the specific 
physical invasion of the curtilage.174 In determining whether or not a search 
                                                 
166 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 
540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (emphasis added). 
167 Id. (emphasis added). 
168 See id. 
169 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the “Katz 
expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and complications” similar to those in this 
case). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. (stating new technology may provide increased convenience or security at 
the expense of privacy). 
172 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409. 
173 Id. at 1415. 
174 Id. The Court drew a distinction between going up to the front door and 
knocking and bringing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of 
discovering incriminating evidence. Id. at 1416. 
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occurred, the Court emphasized the intention of the officers when applying 
the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis: “the scope of a license—
express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a 
specific purpose.”175 For a second time in a year, the Court skirted the issue 
of defining a reasonable expectation of privacy in something abstract, 
leaving the door open for an opinion holding that familial DNA searches do 
not infringe upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
2.  A Search Defined in a Multi-step Process: When is the “Constitutional 
Moment” in Familial DNA Searching? 
In most Fourth Amendment cases, defining the “search” is not a 
complicated issue; rather, courts focus on the reasonableness of the search in 
the case context. In the context of familial DNA searching, however, a court 
must determine the “constitutional moment” from among many possibilities, 
due its multi-step, technical, and scientific process. 176  For example, the 
moment of the search could be when the offender sample is collected, when 
DNA testing is conducted, when the sample is uploaded to the database, 
when the database search is conducted, or when the sample of the target 
individual is retested.177 The rights of multiple individuals in the process also 
complicate the search issue.178 The search of one person through the DNA 
collection process may potentially affect the constitutional rights of another 
if familial DNA searching is used. 179  This intermingling of individuals 
involved in the process requires a careful analysis of each step in the process 
and a study of what case sets precedent at each one of these steps. 
Unquestionably, using a buccal swab on the inside of an individual’s 
cheek to collect a sample for DNA testing is a search.180 The more critical 
question regarding familial DNA searching, however, is what subsequent 
steps in the process also constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. A 
2012 case from the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Davis, attempted to apply 
the Fourth Amendment to the downstream DNA testing and its database 
derivatives. 181  Relying on a combination of Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives and United States v. Mitchell,182 the Fourth Circuit held that the 
“extraction of DNA and the creation of a DNA profile result in a sufficiently 
                                                 
175 Id. at 1416 (emphasis added). 
176 Murphy, supra note 85, at 332 (discussing the difficulty in identifying which 
step involves constitutional scrutiny). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 334. 
179 Id. 
180 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (holding that using a buccal 
swab on the inner tissue of a person’s cheek is a search). 
181 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d. 226 (4th Cir. 2012). 
182 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); United 
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that the processing of the DNA 
sample and creation of the DNA profile is a search). 
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separate invasion of privacy that such acts must be considered a separate 
search under the Fourth Amendment even when there is no issue concerning 
the collection of the DNA sample.”183 While Skinner did not involve DNA 
testing, the Court determined that because the collection and subsequent 
testing of urine from railroad employees intruded upon the expectations of 
privacy that our society has long regarded as reasonable, the intrusions were 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.184  Citing Arizona v. Hicks, 185  the 
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit concluded in 
Johnson v. Quander that “accessing the records stored in the CODIS 
database is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”186 Under the 
sparse case precedent regarding the steps in DNA testing, the creation of a 
DNA profile may constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment; however, 
the search of a database would not.187 
Despite the complex issues surrounding the collection, testing, and 
retention of DNA profiles, most courts have not taken a comprehensive step-
by-step approach to the constitutionality of DNA databases and their uses.188 
Instead, focusing on the collection of the DNA sample as the critical step, 
federal and state statutes authorizing the collection of DNA samples from 
persons convicted of qualifying offenses have been universally upheld.189 
The courts have not sufficiently addressed the issue of what can be done with 
the samples once in the database and, specifically, whether retrospective 
searches of DNA profiles are lawful.190 
                                                 
183 Davis, 690 F.3d.at 246. 
184 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. Critical to the Court’s analysis were two factors: (1) 
that the testing of the urine could reveal “a host of private medical facts”; and (2) that the 
intimate nature of the collection of the urine implicated privacy interests. 
185  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
186 Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Hicks, while 
entering and searching an apartment based on exigent circumstances, the officer found an 
expensive piece of stereo equipment in plain view. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323–24. The Supreme 
Court concluded that moving the piece of equipment in order to record the serial number from 
its underside constituted a search, but matching the serial numbers to those of stolen 
equipment did not independently involve a Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 324–25. 
187 See Davis, 690 F.3d at 246 (holding that the creation of a DNA profile is a 
search); Johnson, 440 F.3d at 498 (determining that accessing records in CODIS is not a 
search). 
188 Murphy, supra note 85 at 333 (noting that courts have not analyzed the 
moments in DNA testing separately). 
189 See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 
451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Groceman v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 2008). 
190 Murphy, supra note 85 at 335 (discussing what can be done with a sample once 
collected). 
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B.  Standing: Multiple Interests at Stake 
Standing is a central component to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Even though the Fourth Amendment does not specifically 
speak of standing, a number of Supreme Court cases have articulated a 
standing requirement for a valid Fourth Amendment claim. 191  “Fourth 
Amendment rights ... may not be vicariously asserted.”192  Typically, the 
issue of standing is coalesced in the Katz expectation of privacy inquiry; 
essentially, for a defendant to challenge the admission of evidence under a 
Fourth Amendment claim, he or she must demonstrate that his or her 
legitimate expectation of privacy was violated. 193  The usually relatively 
straightforward determination of whether a person has standing under the 
Fourth Amendment is complicated in the setting of familial DNA searches. 
The vacated Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Pool alludes to the 
complexities inherent in familial DNA searching: “[i]t is not clear that 
familial comparisons raise a constitutional privacy issue or, if they do, whose 
interests are violated.”194 Despite not dealing with familial DNA searching 
directly, the court analogizes familial DNA searching with a photograph 
lineup: 
It is questionable whether the rights of the perpetrator (if 
ultimately identified through the use of familial 
comparisons) are violated. This seems somewhat analogous 
to a witness looking at a photograph of one person and 
stating that the perpetrator has a similar appearance which 
leads the police to show the witness photos of similar 
looking individuals, one of whom the witness identifies as 
the perpetrator. It is questionable whether the person whose 
photograph helped focus the inquiry, or whose familial 
comparison helped focus the inquiry, has suffered any 
invasion of his or her constitutional right to privacy.195 
                                                 
191 See e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that an overnight guest in a home has standing to challenge a search 
in that home); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (ruling that an individual who has neither 
a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property 
seized does not have standing to challenge the search). 
192 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
193 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 (stating that the individuals in the automobile did not 
show that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment). “To 
mount a successful motion to suppress, an accused must first establish that he personally has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the object that was searched.” United States v. Stringer, 
739 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2014). 
194 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 659 F.3d 
761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
195 Id. 
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Therefore, even if a familial DNA search implicates a Fourth Amendment 
search, it is unclear if the individual whose rights were theoretically violated 
would have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.196 
C.  Is the Search Reasonable? 
Assuming a familial DNA search challenge can successfully 
navigate its way through being categorized as an actual “search” with an 
infringement on the reasonable expectation of privacy of the relative 
implicated, the court would then have to address the reasonableness of that 
search.197 Ordinarily, for a search to be reasonable, the government must first 
obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate.198 However, warrantless 
searches may be constitutional as long as they are reasonable.199 In some 
cases, “[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished 
expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found 
that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless 
search or seizure reasonable.”200 Furthermore, in Maryland v. King, the Court 
stated that “[t]he need for a warrant is perhaps least when the search involves 
no discretion that could properly be limited by the ‘interpo[lation of] a 
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer.’”201 
In Maryland v. King, the Court implied that a search of an individual who 
has not been suspected of any wrong-doing would be analyzed under the 
special needs test and not the totality of the circumstances test.202 
In DNA collection statute cases, the courts are split as to how to 
determine reasonableness: the special needs test 203  or the totality of the 
                                                 
196 See Murphy, supra note 85, at 333 (discussing standing issues associated with 
familial DNA searching). 
197 See supra Part III.A (discussing whether a familial DNA search would be 
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
198 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment dictates that law enforcement officers must demonstrate that they have probable 
cause to believe that the search will reveal particular evidence of a crime. This determination 
must be made by a neutral magistrate. Id. at 21. 
199 Id. at 9 (holding that the Constitution only forbids unreasonable searches and 
seizures). 
200 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
201 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 667 (1989)). 
202 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978. 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that the special need was to procure reliable identifying information, reduce recidivism, and 
protect communities); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that 
the special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to assist in solving crimes); Green v. 
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the special need was to create a reliable 
identification for storing in the database to solve past and future crimes); United States v. 
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (holing that the special need was to create a 
DNA-indexing database); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (determining that 
the special need was to reduce and prevent the recidivism rate). 
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circumstances test.204 Regardless of the approach taken or justification given, 
the United States Supreme Court has concluded that DNA collection statutes 
are constitutional.205 Notably, however, none of these cases have addressed 
the derivative privacy concern of a potential third party, the relative of the 
individual in the database.206 In addressing the constitutionality of familial 
DNA searches in the future, courts may take either the special needs 
approach or the totality of the circumstances approach.207 
D.  Maryland v. King and Familial DNA Searching 
In Maryland v. King, the Court for the first time ruled on a DNA 
Fourth Amendment case in what Justice Alito referred to as “perhaps the 
most important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in 
decades.” 208  While King did not specifically consider familial DNA 
searching, it may illuminate how the Court will treat DNA testing and 
searching in future cases. King addressed the constitutionality of the most 
liberal type of DNA collection statutes—those involving the requirement of 
arrestees to submit a DNA sample to the database.209 Twenty-eight states and 
the federal government have adopted laws authorizing the collection of DNA 
from some or all arrestees for inclusion into the database. 210  Minnesota 
passed a statue in 2006 that authorized the collection of DNA samples from 
arrestees.211 However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the statute 
violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable 
searches and seizure.212 
                                                 
204 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680–81 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 
413–14 (5th Cir. 2004); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. 
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306–07 (4th Cir. 1992). 
205 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978. 
206 See supra notes 200–201. 
207 Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale 
Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 35–36 (2010) (discussing the special 
needs and totality of the circumstances test applied to familial DNA searching). 
208 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) 
(No. 12-207), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_
transcripts/12-207-lp23.pdf. 
209 King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (holding that when officers make an arrest, taking and 
analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is a legitimate police booking procedure that is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
210 Id. at 1968. 
211 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105 (West 2006). 
212 In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
statutory provisions that direct law enforcement to take biological specimens from individuals 
who have had a probable cause determination on a charged offense but who have not been 
convicted are unconstitutional). Of note, Minnesota law allows biological specimens for the 
purpose of DNA analysis from persons who have appeared in court and have had a judicial 
probable cause determination on a charge of committing certain levels of crimes. Minn. Stat. 
§ 299C.105 (a)(1) (2015) 
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In King, the Supreme Court lauded the transformative and 
revolutionary capabilities that DNA technology has and will have on the 
criminal justice system, stating that DNA has “the potential to significantly 
improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative 
practices.”213 Perhaps King’s most influential holding, as it relates to DNA 
databases in general, is that the legitimate governmental interest at play is the 
identification of individuals, and not crime-solving.214 King also highlighted 
the routine use of DNA by stating that “the use of DNA for identification is 
no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a 
previously unidentified suspect.”215 This statement diminishes many of the 
policy concerns that have plagued familial DNA searching arguments in the 
past. 216  These statements indicate that the Supreme Court believes DNA 
testing is not only a routine identification procedure, but also a mechanism of 
great value to the criminal justice system. 
The Court also pointed out that because the DNA testing is limited to 
the thirteen CODIS loci, the testing “did not intrude on [King’s] privacy in a 
way that would make his DNA identification unconstitutional.”217 Hinting at 
potential expanded uses of the databases, the Court also stated that future 
privacy concerns could be implicated if the samples were used in other ways 
“not relevant to identity.” 218  The types of testing that the Court was 
concerned with include additional genetic testing that may signify a 
predisposition to a particular disease. 219  The Court concluded that DNA 
identification of arrestees is a “reasonable search that can be considered part 
of a routine booking procedure.”220  The King decision indicates that the 
Supreme Court may favor a DNA-based investigative technique such as 
familial DNA searching. 
IV.  TWO APPROCHES TO IMPLEMENTING FAMILIAL DNA 
SEARCHING: LEGISLATION OR ADMINSTRATIVE POLICY 
Although Minnesota does not currently have a specific policy on 
familial DNA searching, Minnesota may conceivably implement familial 
DNA searching through state statute or administrative action. The nation’s 
                                                 
213 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (citing Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. 
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009)). 
214 Id. at 1970. 
215 Id. at 1972. 
216 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 85 (discussing racial discrimination, privacy 
concerns, and societal interest of intact families as policy reasons against familial DNA 
searching ); Gabel, supra note 207, at 26 (arguing that familial DNA searching would subject 
hundreds of thousands of innocent people to a lifetime of genetic surveillance). 
217 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. (noting that additional privacy concerns would be implicated if the testing 
was conducted to identify an arrestee’s predisposition to a disease or other hereditary factors). 
220 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
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current familial DNA searching landscape includes a number of proposed 
bills allowing familial DNA searching at both the state and federal levels, 
and administrative policies from state attorney generals, state law 
enforcement agencies, and forensic science laboratories.221 Conversely, only 
two states have statutes prohibiting familial DNA searching.222 Due to the 
intermingling of legal implications and scientific technicalities, the United 
States has had a difficult time determining the best approach to implementing 
familial DNA searching policies at both the federal and state levels.223 
A.  General DNA Database Statutes 
Though it has not directly addressed the issue of familial DNA 
searching, the federal government has passed a number of statutes relating to 
the establishment of DNA databases and the use of such information. The 
DNA Identification Act of 1994 was the principal legislation that required 
the FBI to maintain a national DNA database through which each state could 
submit and share DNA information.224 The DNA Identification Act states 
that “the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish an 
index of—(1) DNA identification records of--persons convicted of crimes; . . 
. and (2) analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes.”225 The 
DNA Identification Act further “allow[s] disclosure of stored DNA samples 
and DNA analyses only to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement 
identification purposes.”226 The DNA Identification Act specifically allows 
for the collection and retention of the DNA identification records of 
convicted offenders as well as DNA profiles from samples recovered from 
                                                 
221 See H.F. 981, 87th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.B. 2059, 107th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2011); Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 
2011, H.R. 3361, 112th Cong. (2011); Mem. from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Att’y Gen., to All 
Cal. Law Enforcement Agencies and Dist. Att’ys Offices, DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene 
DNA Profile to Offender) Policy (2008), available at http://www.denverda.org/
DNA_Documents/Policies/CA%20FS%20Policy.pdf [hereinafter Att’y Gen. Brown Mem.]; 
COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY (Oct. 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Familial_DNA/CBI%20DNA%C20Familial%
C20Search%C20Policy%C20Oct%C202009%-̈%s0Signed.pdf [hereinafter Colorado DNA 
Search Policy]. 
222 See D.C. CODE § 22-4151 (2009) (stating that “DNA collected by an agency of 
the District of Columbia shall not be searched for the purpose of identifying a family member 
related to the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY §2-506(d) (West 2010) (noting that “[a] person may not perform a search of the 
statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a 
crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the 
DNA sample was acquired”). 
223 See supra Parts II–III (discussing the scientific background and Fourth 
Amendment considerations of familial DNA searching). 
224 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006) (establishing an index to facilitate law enforcement 
exchange of DNA identification information). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. (emphasis added). 
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crime scenes.227 Furthermore, the DNA Identification Act states the purpose 
of such a database is identification, which is consistent with the Court’s 
decision in King.228 
Individual state DNA collection statutes vary in their wording and 
specificity. Although most are heavy on specifics for what crimes qualify for 
submission of an offenders DNA profile, the statutes are unclear as to what 
can be done with the DNA profiles once in the database. For example, the 
Minnesota DNA collection statute illustrates the general language commonly 
seen: 
As used in this section, “DNA analysis” means the process 
through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human 
biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA 
from another human biological specimen for identification 
purposes.229 
The Minnesota statute further discusses the state database by stating “[t]he 
bureau shall establish a centralized system to cross-reference data obtained 
from DNA analysis.”230 The Minnesota statute, like most other state DNA 
statutes, is invariably vague and silent as to what may be done with samples 
once collected.231 The focus and detail of DNA database statutes surrounds 
what offenses qualify for requiring the collection of an individual’s 
sample. 232  The general language of many state statutes adds to the 
uncertainty of whether familial DNA searching may be conducted under 
their authority.233 
B.  Familial DNA Searching Statutes 
Currently, there are no statutes explicitly authorizing familial DNA 
searching at the state or national level. 234  However, Maryland and the 
District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions in the United States that 
                                                 
227 Id. 
228 Id.; see supra Part III.D (outlining the King decision). 
229 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West 2005). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.117 
(West 2010). 
233 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-13-05 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
81.3 (West 2005). See also National Conference of State Legislatures, Forensic Science Laws 
Database, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/dna-laws-database.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Forensic Science Laws Database] (permitting users to 
search state-by-state laws enacted that address the administration and use of forensic science 
by state justice systems). 
234 See Forensic Science Laws Database, supra note 233. 
28
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/4
2015] FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING IN MINNESOTA 495 
currently prohibit familial DNA searching through statutory mandate. 235 
Most states are underutilizing familial DNA searching due to the lack of 
statutory authorization. 
Legislation that explicitly authorizes the use of familial DNA 
searching has been introduced at the state and federal level. At the federal 
level in November 2011, Representative Adam Schiff introduced House Bill 
3361 entitled “Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2011,” 
touting the success of California’s familial DNA testing protocol in the 
“Grim Sleeper” case.236 The bill required that the Attorney General adopt 
policies and procedures to ensure that familial DNA searching was 
conducted at the national level in federal investigations.237 Additionally, it 
allowed state CODIS administrators to request familial searches for state 
investigations. 238  The bill stated that the privacy interests of persons 
identified through a familial search must be “carefully protected,” but did not 
outline how or to what extent this should be accomplished.239 The bill also 
specified what types of crimes qualify for a familial search at the federal 
level. 240  Hearings were held by the Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security Committee, but no further action was taken on the bill.241 
In addition to House Bill 3361, three states have introduced state 
legislation in support of familial DNA searching. In 2011, Minnesota and 
Tennessee introduced nearly identical bills authorizing the use of familial 
DNA searches.242 The bills merely stated that familial DNA searching can be 
conducted, without proscribing how.243 The Minnesota Public Safety and 
Crime Prevention Policy and Finance Committee heard testimony on the bill, 
and the bill was subsequently laid over. 244  The main concern with the 
Minnesota bill was that it transferred full rulemaking authority over to the 
superintendent of the state law enforcement agency without any oversight or 
public debate.245 Under the bill, the rules promulgated by the superintendent 
outlining the details of how familial DNA searching would be conducted 
were not subject to the rulemaking provisions of the legislature. This lack of 
legislative oversight, accountability, and public comment was problematic 
                                                 
235 See D.C. CODE § 22-4151 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §2-506(d) 
(West 2010). 
236 Dane C. Barca, Familial DNA Testing, House Bill 3361, and the Need for 
Federal Oversight, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 502 (2013). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 See H.F. 981, 87th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.B. 2059, 107th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2011). 
243 Id. 
244 Public Safety and Crime Prevention Policy and Finance Committee Minutes, 
Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/minutes1.asp?comm=
87015&id=401 
245 Id. 
29
Liberty: Defending the Black Sheep of the Forensic DNA Family
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
496 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:467 
for some representatives at the hearing.246 Proponents of the bill noted that 
familial DNA searching is just another tool for law enforcement to use when 
investigations in homicides and sexual assaults hit a dead end.247 Moreover, 
the bill’s proponents argued that the detail required in familial DNA 
searching procedures would best be left in the hands of those most familiar 
with the intricacies of the testing, and not the legislature.248 The fiscal note to 
the bill estimated the annual cost for such searches (approximately 10 to 12 
per year), at approximately $59,000.249 Notably, the same bill was introduced 
again in Minnesota’s 88th Legislative Session in 2014 and referred to the 
Public Safety Finance and Policy Committee.250 To date, nothing has come 
of either bill. 
In 2013, the New York legislature introduced a bill establishing 
standards and regulations to permit familial DNA searching and to utilize 
partial DNA matches as an investigative tool in unsolved crimes.251 The New 
York bill was more detailed than either the Minnesota or Tennessee bill, 
differentiating between partial matches and familial DNA searching. 252 
Furthermore, the bill required the New York Commission on Forensic 
Science to “promulgate standards that permit familial searching and the 
release of partial matches to investigating law enforcement officials.”253 The 
bill further outlined the types of crimes that may be subject to familial DNA 
searching and established statistical thresholds be met before names were 
released to law enforcement. 254  Details of the bill also included the 
requirement of YSTR testing.255 The bill was referred to the Committee on 
Governmental Operations in April, 2014. 256  This same bill was recently 
reintroduced in January 2015 to the New York Assembly.257 This continual 
reintroduction of both the Minnesota and New York bills seems to indicate 
that both states recognize the need for such legislation, but perhaps lack the 
understanding about the details that would help the bills pass. 
                                                 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 See Ruben Rosario, New DNA technique: Does it fight crime or deprive 
rights?, TWINCITIES.COM—PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.twincities.com/
localnews/ci_17648547. 
250 See H.F. 1907, 88th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2014). 
251 See Assemb. B. 9247, 237th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. The New York Commission on Forensic Science was established pursuant 
to state statute in 1994 to develop forensic science standards and accreditation program for 
laboratories throughout New York. Forensic DNA sub-committee members include a 
population geneticist, molecular biologist and forensic scientist. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 995-b 
(McKinney 1999). 
254 Assemb. B. 9247, 237th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 See Assemb. B. 1515, 238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). 
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The Innocence Project addressed the question of whether familial 
DNA searching demands statutory authorization, or whether it can be guided 
sufficiently via administrative policies.258 Despite its official stance against 
the use of familial DNA searching, the Innocence Project nevertheless 
recommends that if it is conducted, it should be through statutory 
authorization.259 The Innocence Project provides three justifications for why 
this authority and direction must come from the legislature rather than 
through executive action or deference to law-enforcement: 
 
(1) The need for legislative authority was recognized when 
DNA databases were created, and any extensions of power 
regarding their use must also be made through legislation; 
(2) Legislatures are uniquely capable of considering how the 
negative collateral effects of the use of familial DNA 
searching can be minimized; and 
(3) Legislative action fosters public debate.260 
 
No state has yet enacted familial DNA legislation, but the discussion is 
ongoing and state legislative representatives continue to introduce familial 
DNA bills.261 Despite the lack of statutory authorization, a number of states 
are nonetheless currently conduct familial DNA searches through 
administrative action.262 
C.  State Administrative Policies 
The lack of transparency and public disclosure of state policies and 
practices regarding familial DNA searching makes it difficult to determine 
how many states currently use this practice. 263  At least four states have 
detailed public familial DNA state policies: California, Colorado, Texas, and 
Virginia.264 California was the first state to officially utilize familial DNA 
                                                 
258 Innocence Project Position on Familial Searching of DNA Databases, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-
the-law/FamilialSearchPolicyFinal.pdf/view. 
259 Id. at 5. 
260 Id. 
261 See supra notes 250 257 (referencing the bills that were reintroduced in 
Minnesota and New York). 
262 See e.g., Meghan Dwyer & Stephen Davis, Wisconsin now using controversial 
DNA testing to solve crimes, FOX6 NOW (Oct. 23, 2014), http://fox6now.com
/2014/10/23/wisconsin-uses-controversial-dna-testing-to-solve-crimes/ Familial DNA 
Database Sources, DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://www.denverda.org/
DNA/Familial_DNA_Database_Searches.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter 
Familial DNA Database Searches] (demonstrating through state policies of California, 
Virginia, Texas, and Colorado that a number of states are conducting familial DNA searching 
through administrative action). 
263 Ram, supra note 68, at 807. 
264 See Familial DNA Database Searches, supra note 262. 
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searching. 265  California’s policy, implemented in 2008, is outlined in a 
memorandum from the Attorney General and prescribes procedures for when 
a partial match is obtained through routine searching and how law 
enforcement may request an intentional familial DNA search. 266  The 
memorandum also outlines criteria for when the name of an offender may be 
released to the agency.267 Notably, the California Department of Justice has 
created a familial DNA search committee that reviews information and 
determines how to proceed with each case.268 California’s policy requires 
that statistical analysis be performed to determine the level of association, 
that YSTR testing should be conducted, and that non-forensic information be 
reviewed “in order to identify additional evidence bearing on relatedness.”269 
A committee composed of California Department of Justice scientists, 
investigators, and attorneys administers the familial DNA searching 
program.270 The policy was developed “keeping privacy concerns in mind 
while at the same time providing information that may be useful in solving a 
violent offense.”271 Moreover, the California Department of Justice has an 
extensive validation study published that outlines and describes its familial 
DNA searching processes and algorithms.272 
In 2009, the Director of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation 
promulgated Colorado’s policy, which is similar to California’s policy in 
many respects. 273  Colorado’s policy specifically states that the lead 
investigator must have received specialized training in familial DNA 
evidence, that the report clearly indicates that the association is not an 
identification, and that the information is for investigative purposes only.274 
Meanwhile, Texas’ policy, described in the standard operating procedures of 
the laboratory, distinguishes between a partial match and a deliberate familial 
DNA search.275  The policy states “[i]n order to ensure transparency and 
integrity, it is imperative that all agencies involved in the process 
communicate, work together and understand the limitations of the 
information the search provides.”276 
                                                 
265 Murphy, supra note 85, at 293. 
266 See Att’y Gen. Brown Mem., supra note 221. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Chamberlain, supra note 104, at 26. 
271 See Att’y Gen. Brown Mem., supra note 221. 
272 Steven P. Myers et al., Searching for first-degree familial relationships in 
California’s offender DNA database: Validation of a likelihood ratio-based approach, 5 
FORENSIC SCI.INT’L: GENETICS 493 (2011). 
273 See Colorado DNA Search Policy, supra note 221. 
274 Id. 
275 See TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES: PARTIAL 
MATCHES AND FAMILIAL SEARCHES 1 (April 24, 2012), available at http://www.denverda.org/
DNA_Documents/Familial_DNA/Tx%20FS%20policy.pdf. 
276 Id. at 2. 
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Even some of the harshest critics of familial DNA searching argue 
that if a state is going to allow familial DNA searching, the state must 
implement a comprehensive and robust procedure that allows for public 
accountability. 277  The California policy is heralded by familial DNA 
opponents for including and considering: (1) a limitation to serious offenses; 
(2) separation of scientists from the local law enforcement; (3) withholding 
names until necessary for final investigation; (4) specificity in imposing a 
threshold match criteria; and (5) developing specialized software. 278 
Furthermore, there is serious concern that familial DNA searching would be 
overused and that a policy should include a report on the frequency and 
results of familial DNA searching conducted by the laboratory to an 
oversight committee that ensures its scope is appropriate.279 In addition, the 
FBI recommends that policies and procedures should address, at a minimum, 
the following topics: (1) privacy considerations; (2) release of information; 
(3) process for approval of search requests; (4) types of crimes eligible; (5) 
frequency of searches; (6) use of additional genetic testing (e.g. YSTR) to 
narrow search results; (7) reporting of search results; and (8) categories 
searched (e.g. offenders only, offenders and arrestees). 280 Regardless of the 
method of implementation, states should ensure they address all of the 
unique considerations that familial DNA searching presents.281 
Certainly, the familial DNA searching landscape is complex. The 
scientific intricacies and unique constitutional considerations make 
navigating the familial DNA searching terrain difficult.282 However, this lack 
of understanding can be overcome through educating both the legal and 
scientific communities. Laboratories and law enforcement agencies can 
support this effort by establishing rules and procedures, whether through 
statutory authorization or administrative actions, that are open to scrutiny and 
public debate.283 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Familial DNA searching is a modern investigative tool that should 
be available to law enforcement when investigations in high-level crimes 
                                                 
277 See Innocence Project Position on Familial Searching of DNA Databases, 
supra note 258. 
278 Erin E. Murphy, Familial DNA Searches, 27-SPG CRIM. JUST. 19, 23 (2012). 
279 Id. 
280 Familial Searching, supra note 9. 
281 See supra Parts II–III (discussing the scientific background and Fourth 
Amendment considerations of familial DNA searching). 
282 See supra Part II–III (discussing the scientific background and Fourth 
Amendment considerations of familial DNA searching). 
283 See supra Part III (discussing the different approaches to implementing familial 
DNA searching). 
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have stalled. 284  Familial DNA searching is constitutional, effective, and 
based on sound scientific principles.285 Moreover, familial DNA searching is 
often misunderstood by the legal community, which leads to false 
assumptions regarding its potential to invade the privacy of innocent 
individuals.286 Minnesota should conduct familial DNA searching at the state 
level through statutory authorization, whether implicitly, through the existing 
DNA database legislation, or explicitly, through new legislation that 
expressly authorizes familial DNA.287  However, the details regarding the 
methods should be delegated to forensic science laboratories, with oversight 
from a multi-disciplinary committee.288 
A.  Familial DNA Searching is an Effective and Scientifically Valid 
Procedure That Will Assist the Criminal Justice System 
Familial DNA searching has generated strong opposition for three 
main reasons: (1) the legal community and general public do not understand 
the underlying scientific principles and forensic scientists do not understand 
the underlying legal implications; 289  (2) society is concerned about the 
sociological ramifications;290 and (3) the method of investigation is rooted in 
technology.291 However, all three of these issues can be addressed with open 
communication and education regarding familial DNA searching. This 
comment suggests that a deeper understanding of both the scientific and legal 
components of familial DNA searching will bridge the gap that exists 
between scientists and legal professionals. 
Familial DNA searching involves genetic principles, a multi-step 
process, and scientific language to communicate the results. 292  However, 
familial DNA searching is nothing more than an extension of the principles 
applied when statistics are given between matching DNA profiles.293 Genetic 
associations are routinely made between known DNA profiles and DNA 
                                                 
284 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the scientific validity and effectiveness of 
familial DNA searching). 
285 See infra Part IV.A–B (outlining the scientific principles of familial DNA 
searching and the constitutional considerations). 
286 See BUTLER, Advanced Topics, supra note 30 at 607 (stating that law 
professors often raise the unfounded “specter of so-called ‘genetic surveillance’”). 
287 See infra Parts V.C–V.D (arguing that familial DNA searching is more 
effective at the state level and detailing the methods of implementation). 
288 See infra Part V.D.3 (discussing the importance of transparency and proper 
oversight). 
289 See supra Parts II–III (discussing the scientific principles and constitutional 
implications behind familial DNA searching). 
290 See supra text accompanying note 114 (listing the sociological basis of the 
effectiveness of familial DNA searching). 
291 See supra Part III.A (discussing Fourth Amendment technology concerns). 
292 See supra Part II (describing the background and complexities of familial DNA 
searching). 
293 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency estimates 
of DNA profiles). 
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profiles obtained from evidence.294 In fact, forensic DNA testing has gained 
widespread acceptance in United States courts because scientists can 
represent the probability of that match through statistics.295 The same can be 
said for familial DNA searching associations. Based on underlying principles 
of genetic inheritance, combined with the frequency of different alleles, 
forensic scientists can determine the probability that two DNA profiles are 
from related individuals.296 An individual shares one allele at each area tested 
with a biological parent.297 If the evidence profile is not an exact match with 
an individual within the database but shares one allele at each area tested, 
there is a high probability that the donor of that evidence sample is either a 
parent or child of the individual in the database.298  This example is the 
simplest scenario, but the same principles can be applied to siblings.299 
The initial search of the DNA database is only the first step in the 
process. The software utilized for familial DNA searching produces a 
potential list of individuals in ranked order.300 Theoretically, the individual 
ranked first is more likely to be a relative of the individual responsible for 
the DNA profile obtained from the crime scene than the individual ranked 
number twenty, but this association is confirmed through additional genetic 
testing.301 Scientists then conduct YSTR testing on the male individuals to 
determine whether they are in fact related through their male lineage.302 Once 
the familial association is confirmed through genetics, law enforcement 
conducts a traditional investigation to determine if it is feasible that this 
individual could have committed the crime. 303  Imagine the following 
scenario:304 A crime was committed 20 years ago in Minneapolis and the 
                                                 
294 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing a random match 
probability). 
295 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that DNA testing is reliable 
because it is based on statistical estimations, unlike fingerprints, where currently, no 
mathematical association is possible). 
296 See supra notes 90, 94 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood ratio 
and how it is applied to familial DNA searching). 
297 See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining how one-half of an 
individual’s genetic information comes from his or her father and one half comes from his or 
her mother). 
298 See supra Part II.B.4 (describing the procedures involved in identifying and 
refining a familial DNA search). 
299 See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting the difference between 
parent/child genetic relationships and sibling genetic relationships). 
300 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing the ranking process in 
familial DNA searching) 
301 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that unrelated individuals 
may share alleles by chance alone). 
302 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining the male lineage of 
YSTR markers. Alternatively, mitochondrial DNA can be used for testing associations 
between females). 
303 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the U.K. approach to 
refining the initial familial DNA searching results). 
304 Chamberlain, supra note 104, at 28 (outlining a similar scenario). 
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witnesses described the perpetrator as an older Caucasian man. 305  The 
convicted offender identified through a possible familial DNA association 
was an 18 year old African-American man with no siblings.306 He lives in 
Saint Paul, but his parents still reside in New York where he was raised.307 
This information may lead the investigation team to withhold the name of the 
offender.308 In contrast, suppose the convicted offender was identified as an 
18 year old Caucasian male with a father that lived in Minneapolis 20 years 
ago and matches the description of the perpetrator.309 This information might 
lead the investigative team to release the name of the offender since the 
metadata tend to support the familial association.310 Familial DNA searching 
is not conducted in a vacuum, and is only a piece in the investigative 
puzzle.311 
Familial DNA searching is effective because, statistically speaking, 
crime runs in the family.312 This is not to say that all individuals with a father 
or mother who commits a crime will fall into a life of crime themselves, but 
when statistics indicate that there will be a close relative in the database 50% 
of the time, familial DNA searching should not be overlooked as an effective 
investigative tool.313 Traditional investigations, those not involving DNA, 
frequently use familial associations.314 Detectives investigating a homicide 
routinely talk to relatives of a suspect to gather more investigative 
information.315 Nor would it be unusual for a detective to use someone’s past 
criminal history to deem him or her a suspect in a crime that occurred near 
his or her residence. 316  These methods of investigation are practiced 
routinely without the auspicious name “familial DNA searching.” Adding 
science and technology to the equation simply seems to invite critical 
debate.317 
Implementing a successful familial DNA searching program now 
will yield significant benefits in the future. Familial DNA searching will 
                                                 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 See supra text accompanying note 128 (noting that the metadata is only 
available at the state level). 
311 See supra Part II.C (describing the process and successes of familial DNA 
searching in an investigative context). 
312 See supra text accompanying note 118 (stating that 46% of jail inmates had a 
family member who had been incarcerated). 
313 See supra text accompanying note 119 (stating that statistically, there will be a 
relative in the database approximately half of the time). 
314 See supra text accompanying note 215 (comparing DNA identification to 
identifying someone from a wanted poster). 
315 See Kaye, supra note 158, at 146 (stating that police may locate relatives 
through public records). 
316 Id. (discussing the many methods of routine investigation). 
317 See supra text accompanying note 216 (noting the policy arguments that have 
been made regarding familial DNA searching). 
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become more effective as DNA databases age.318 For example, in 20 years, 
more parent-child relationships will exist between an individual in the 
database and an individual who left DNA at a crime scene. 319  Statutes 
requiring the submission of convicted offender samples into DNA databases 
did not become common until the late 1990s. 320  As time goes on, the 
databases will start to span across generations, which will lead to more 
potential associations between parent and child.321 In fact, recent successes 
with familial DNA searching have solved cold cases from decades ago by 
identifying a child of the perpetrator in the database.322 
B.  Familial DNA Searching Will Withstand Fourth Amendment 
Constitutional Scrutiny 
1.  Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In addition to being consistent with scientific principles and widely-
accepted investigative practices, familial DNA searching is likely 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.323 According to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Katz, in order to implicate the Fourth Amendment, there 
must be a subjective expectation of privacy in the thing to be searched and 
society must be ready to accept this expectation as reasonable.324 Putting 
aside the technicalities of familial DNA searching, a more basic question is 
whether someone would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her DNA profile. In Jones, the concurring justices suggested that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy question has changed with the advent of 
new technology.325  Assessing the privacy expectations of a technological 
society requires a new balancing of what individuals are willing to give up in 
exchange for increased security.326 The constitutionality of a familial DNA 
                                                 
318 See supra text accompanying notes 137–141 (explaining how familial DNA 
searching will become more effective as databases age). 
319 See supra text accompanying note 138 (noting that the number of relatives in 
the database will increase as children of previous offenders are included). 
320 See supra text accompanying note 3 (stating that the national DNA database 
was operational in 1998). 
321 See supra text accompanying notes 137–141(explaining how familial DNA 
searching will become more effective as databases age). 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 104, 107, 109 (describing the successful 
familial DNA searching cases in California and Minnesota). 
323 See supra Part II (discussing the scientific validity and investigative process 
that follows familial DNA searching). 
324 See supra text accompanying note 151 (explaining Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion in Katz). 
325 See supra text accompanying note 170 (distinguishing Jones from Katz due to 
the presence of new technology). 
326 See supra text accompanying note 171 (describing Justice Alito’s balancing of 
interests in assessing a reasonable expectation of privacy with new technology). 
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search turns on whether society finds that the identification of criminal 
perpetrators outweighs individual privacy concerns in their DNA profiles.327 
Maryland v. King established the same approach to assessing the 
expectation of privacy in DNA profiles.328 Noting that the DNA testing was 
limited to the 13 CODIS loci, the Court stated that the DNA testing did not 
unconstitutionally intrude on King’s privacy.329 Even if a court agreed that 
the extraction of DNA and its testing of the 13 CODIS loci constitute a 
search, case law does not support that searching the database for a match 
with this profile constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and 
neither Davis nor King was dispositive of the issue.330 
Arguably, in light of Jardines, whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile may not be the 
most critical question.331 Rather, the Court in Jardines changed course and 
considered the purpose of the search and the police officer’s intention while 
analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry.332 This distinction 
could factor into the Court’s analysis in a familial DNA searching case.333 
The question of whether an individual in the database has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile may change to if that 
individual understood the “license” to include a search of the database in 
order to ascertain whether they, or a relative, may have left biological 
evidence at a crime scene. 334  However, because Jardines relied upon a 
trespass and the lack of an implicit or express license, it is difficult to 
conclude how the Court would have ruled had the physical trespass not 
occurred.335 
2.  Familial DNA Searching as a New and Discrete Investigation Method 
Familial DNA searching fits precisely into the category of new and 
discrete law enforcement methodologies that Justice Sotomayor so 
                                                 
327 See supra text accompanying note 171. 
328 See supra text accompanying note 220 (stating that DNA identification of 
arrestees is a reasonable search). 
329 See supra text accompanying note 217. 
330 See supra text accompanying text note 186 (noting that a Fourth Amendment 
search was not implicated when a search of the database was conducted). 
331 See supra text accompanying note 172 (stating that the Court relied on the 
common-law trespass doctrine). 
332 See supra text accompanying note 175 (asserting that the specific purpose of 
police when conducting a search was important to assessing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 39, 40 (noting that police do not have a 
suspect when conducting a search of the DNA database). 
334 See supra text accompanying note 175 (discussing the scope of the license 
when determining whether a search is reasonable). 
335 See supra text accompanying note 173 (noting that the trespassory invasion of 
the porch constituted a search). 
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cautiously discussed in Jones.336 By design, most people do not even know 
that it occurs in laboratories throughout the country, avoiding the community 
debate and oversight that may exist were it more visible.337 In addition, in its 
current state, without proper procedures in many states, familial DNA 
searching evades the necessary checks to limit abusive law enforcement.338 
Accordingly, detailed procedures drafted and implemented with the proper 
oversight are required for familial searching to pass constitutional muster.339 
These procedures should include: (1) the point at which names may be 
released to law enforcement; (2) the searching parameters used; (3) what 
types of cases it may be utilized in; and (4) under what conditions searches 
may proceed.340 Furthermore, having the procedures developed by forensic 
science laboratories rather than law enforcement would alleviate some of the 
concern about arbitrary police power.341 
3.  Familial DNA Searching is a Reasonable Fourth Amendment Search 
In assessing the reasonableness of the search under Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, if the “search” conducted as part of a familial 
DNA search is targeted at the relative and not the pivot person, the special 
needs test applies.342 Law enforcement is not suspecting a certain individual 
when they conduct a familial DNA search.343 At the point of the search, the 
relative of the pivot person is not considered a suspect.344 Therefore, under 
Maryland v. King, the special needs test applies.345 However, if the search is 
conducted on the individual in the database, then a totality of the 
circumstances weighing may be required.346 How courts dissect and describe 
familial DNA searches will intimately factor into the potential constitutional 
                                                 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 166, 167 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s 
concerns about discrete law enforcement practices operating in the absence of oversight from 
a coordinate branch of government). 
337 See supra text accompanying note 77 (pointing to a survey outlining laboratory 
policies on partial matches). 
338 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing how familial DNA 
searching is being conducted without transparency). 
339 See supra text accompanying note 167 (discussing the concerns with a 
procedure like familial DNA searching being conducted without oversight). 
340 See supra text accompanying notes 278, 280 (detailing procedures of a familial 
DNA searching procedure). 
341 See supra text accompanying note 167 (noting the Fourth Amendment’s goal 
of curbing excessive police power). 
342 See supra text accompanying note 202 (arguing that the special needs test 
applies if the search was targeted at an individual who was not suspected of any wrongdoing). 
The pivot person is the individual who is already in the DNA database. 
343 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40 (noting that police do not have a 
suspect when conducting a search of the DNA database). 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 39, 40. 
345 See supra text accompanying note 202. 
346 See supra text accompanying note 202. 
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outcome.347 Certainly, limiting the types of cases that qualify for familial 
DNA searching would help tip the scales by controlling the extent of any 
illusory privacy invasion.348 
Defining and articulating the “constitutional moment” may 
determine the constitutionality of familial DNA searching.349 The sparse case 
law detailing the individual steps in the DNA testing process and subsequent 
searches in the database makes it difficult to assess how courts will view 
familial DNA searching.350 While the Fourth Circuit in Davis indicated that 
the testing and creation of a DNA profile in the laboratory constitutes an 
invasion of privacy, the court relied on Skinner in its analysis.351 Skinner fails 
as an analogy to DNA testing. 352 DNA testing of the 13 CODIS loci does not 
reveal any information except a series of numbers that make up the 
individual’s DNA profile.353 This series of numbers means very little to the 
ordinary citizen.354 A DNA profile reveals no more private information than 
may be gleaned from looking in the mirror: an individual’s identity. 355 
Familial DNA searches do not reveal “private medical facts” that the court 
was concerned with in Skinner.356 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit recently 
suggested that searching a DNA profile in the database would not rise to the 
level of a Fourth Amendment search.357 
4.  An Implicated Relative Would Not Have Standing to Mount a Fourth 
Amendment Challenge 
Assuming that searching a crime-scene sample through a DNA 
database is deemed a constitutional search, familial DNA searching still 
requires careful analysis of which individual has standing to contest the 
database search—the individual whose profile is already in the database or 
                                                 
347 See supra Part III.A.2 (detailing the multiple steps in familial DNA searching 
and the constitutional implications). 
348 See supra text accompanying note 278 (listing the positive attributes of the 
California familial DNA searching policy). 
349 See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the difficulty in determining the 
constitutional moment in the familial DNA searching process). 
350 See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the different approaches to determining the 
constitutional moment in the familial DNA searching process). 
351 See supra text accompanying note 183. 
352 See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting that Skinner did not involve 
DNA testing, but rather urine testing which implicates more privacy concerns). 
353 See supra text accompanying note 217 (noting that testing the 13 CODIS loci 
would not invade on King’s privacy). 
354 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (noting that the CODIS loci do not reveal genetic 
traits). 
355 See supra text accompanying note 214 (describing the governmental interest in 
DNA databases is identification of individuals). 
356 See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the factors critical to the 
analysis in Skinner). 
357 See supra note 186 and accompanying text (stating the holding in Quander—
that a search of the CODIS database would not constitute a search). 
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the relative implicated by the search.358 To date, no courts have considered a 
standing issue akin to that which is encountered in familial DNA 
searching.359 The dual interests involved, those of the pivot person and those 
of the relative who is later implicated, complicate the issue. No harm has 
come to the individual whose DNA profile is being subjected to the search 
because they are not implicated in the crime. The implicated relative, who 
becomes the focus of the investigation, and the potential source of the crime 
scene sample, would likely make a Fourth Amendment challenge.360 
The connection between the implicated relative and the database 
search is too tangential to demonstrate that a legitimate expectation of 
privacy has been violated. 361  Arguably, a familial search association is 
merely a product of diligent police work and no violation of one’s privacy 
has been breached. The police do not actually search the relative’s house or 
obtain their DNA profile.362 Familial DNA searching merely narrows the 
investigation to a certain individual based on similar attributes.363 
5.  Following Maryland v. King, Familial DNA Testing Will be Held 
Constitutional for Identification Purposes 
Now that the Supreme Court gave its stamp of approval in King as to 
the constitutionality of the most liberal collection statute, which requires an 
arrestee to submit a DNA sample for testing and entry into the database, 
future challenges will likely focus on the downstream steps in the process: 
database searches themselves. 364  With limited case law supporting either 
side, how the courts might decide such cases is uncertain.365 Familial DNA 
searching could certainly be a use of the database that falls within the 
“identification” category described in King and therefore, would not raise 
additional constitutional concerns.366 Indeed, the Court specifically discussed 
the potential expansion of DNA databases, and only considered uses “not 
                                                 
358 See supra Part III.B (discussing the issue of standing in the Fourth Amendment 
analysis of familial DNA searching). 
359 See supra note 196. 
360 See supra note 191 and accompanying text (suggesting that standing focuses on 
the actual object that is searched). 
361 See supra text accompanying note 9 (defining familial DNA searching); supra 
Part II.B.4 (describing that the database search is conducted against the pivot person’s DNA 
profile). 
362 See supra Part II.C (describing the familial DNA searching process). 
363 See supra text accompanying note 195 (comparing familial DNA searching to a 
photo line-up and indicating that the perpetrator looks like the individual in the photo). 
364 See supra text accompanying note 205 (noting that the Supreme Court upheld 
DNA collection statutes). 
365 See supra note 188 and accompanying text (noting that most courts have not 
taken a comprehensive step-by-step approach to the constitutionality of DNA databases). 
366 See supra text accompanying note 219 (explaining that the types of additional 
genetic testing that the Court would be concerned with included testing that would identify 
who is predisposed to a certain disease). 
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relevant to identity” as problematic. 367  An individual’s DNA profile is 
nothing more than a sophisticated “picture.” Familial DNA searching may be 
fairly described as looking at a picture and stating that the perpetrator looks 
similar to the individual in that picture.368 
Additionally, King reveals how the Court would consider statutes 
that have expanded the original intent of the DNA databases.369 None of the 
original DNA database statutes included the requirement for submission of 
DNA from individuals arrested.370 The mission creep that is often associated 
with familial DNA searching may be just that: the gradual broadening of the 
original objective, which is not necessarily an unintended phenomenon.371 
By holding that the expansion of DNA databases to arrestees survives 
constitutional scrutiny in King, the Court suggested that expanding the 
original objective of the database is not only warranted, but constitutional.372 
The Court also suggested that it would welcome a new police technique that 
parallels more traditional investigative methods. 373  Because Maryland v. 
King was the first and only Supreme Court decision to address forensic DNA 
Fourth Amendment issues, the Court’s approval of a DNA database 
expansion, which some states had previously found unconstitutional, is a 
victory for familial DNA searching advocates.374 Even though, on its face, 
familial DNA searching may be constitutional, how states conduct and 
implement familial DNA searching policies will weigh considerably on the 
Court’s assessment.375 
C.  Familial DNA Searching Should be Conducted at the State Level 
Despite their great autonomy at the local and state level, many state 
CODIS laboratories are reluctant to participate in procedures that are not 
sanctioned at the national level. 376  Adding to the reluctance of state 
laboratory implementation, many legal professionals feel that state forensic 
                                                 
367 See supra text accompanying note 218. 
368 See supra text accompanying note 195 (noting that the Ninth Circuit, in Pool, 
compared familial DNA searching to a photo lineup). 
369 See supra note 209 and accompanying text (noting that the King decision held 
that arrestee database statutes were constitutional). 
370 See supra text accompanying note 227 (providing that the original DNA 
Identification Act allowed for the collection of convicted offenders). 
371 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/mission%20creep (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
372 See supra note 213 (stating that DNA has the ability to significantly improve 
the criminal justice system). 
373 See supra text accompanying note 215 (highlighting the routine nature of DNA 
testing by comparing DNA testing to looking at a wanted poster). 
374 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota arrestee 
statute was held unconstitutional by the Minnesota Court of Appeals). 
375 See supra text accompanying note 166 (noting the Court’s concerns with law 
enforcement techniques that proceed surreptitiously). 
376 See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing the autonomy of state 
databases). 
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laboratories should not conduct procedures that are not conducted at the 
national level.377 However, the sheer size and nature of the national databases 
prohibits many types of searches that are advantageous and appropriate in 
state or local databases.378 Fortunately, each state has the ability to craft its 
own guidelines and uses for its DNA database.379 Once the DNA profiles are 
uploaded to NDIS, the state loses control of how and when those profiles are 
searched against each other.380 However, each profile also remains at the 
SDIS and LDIS levels and the states can use their discretion on how best to 
use this investigative tool.381 
States’ reluctance to wait for national guidance is problematic 
because the leading DNA forensic science organization, Working Group, has 
advised that familial DNA searching not be conducted at the national 
level.382 The Working Group’s justifications are sound and based on realities 
of the CODIS structure, however, its suggestions must not be misunderstood 
to mean that familial DNA searching should not be conducted at the state 
level.383 The Working Group questions the practicality of the searches—not 
the science.384 The number of profiles at NDIS simply precludes effective 
and efficient familial DNA searching at that level.385 Furthermore, at the state 
level, once a laboratory performs confirmatory YSTR testing, law 
enforcement assesses the association through traditional investigative 
methods.386 This important step is not possible without the metadata that is 
only available at the state level.387 In addition to practical considerations, 
familial DNA searching is more effective at the state level.388 As the size of 
                                                 
377 See supra text accompanying note 244 (defense attorney arguing against 
familial DNA searching in Minnesota because the FBI does not conduct familial DNA 
searching). 
378 See supra text accompanying note 126 (explaining that the number of profiles 
at the national level makes familial DNA searching impractical). 
379 See supra text accompanying note 47 (explaining that each state operates and 
maintains its own DNA database). 
380 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting the legislation governing the 
national database). 
381 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
382 See supra text accompanying note 125 (concluding that familial DNA 
searching not be conducted at the national level). 
383 See supra text accompanying notes 126–132 (explaining the four main reasons 
why familial DNA searching should not be conducted at the national level). 
384 See supra text accompanying notes 126–132 (explaining the four main reasons 
why familial DNA searching should not be conducted at the national level). 
385 See supra text accompanying note 55 (noting that there are close to 13 million 
DNA profiles in NDIS). 
386 See supra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text (describing certain ways to 
refine the initial familial DNA search). 
387 See supra text accompanying note 128 (explaining that metadata, which 
includes age, population group, and geography, is only available at the state level). 
388 See supra text accompanying notes 133–136 (demonstrating that familial DNA 
searching is more effective at the state level due to the smaller size of the database). 
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the database increases, the less likely it will be to have a relative ranked first 
in the list of possible associations.389 
Familial DNA searching will also be more effective at the state level 
due to geographic limitations. Criminals that have offended in Minnesota are 
more likely to reoffend in Minnesota than in another state.390 Additionally, 
conducting familial DNA searching at the state level still allows for 
significant investigative leads because family members tend to reside within 
a certain geographic area.391 
Finally, familial DNA searching at the state level enables more 
oversight and control than is feasible at the national level. Proposed familial 
DNA legislation has invariably required some sort of reporting mechanism to 
ensure proper oversight, and such oversight is more readily accomplished at 
the state level.392 Indeed, the Court has stressed that oversight and control are 
central concerns with new and discrete law enforcement techniques. 393 
California’s policy is arguably successful because of the cooperation 
between the laboratory and the attorney general.394 Such interdisciplinary 
cooperation is more likely to succeed at the state level. 395  Additionally, 
effective oversight of this detail oriented methodology would be problematic 
at the national level.396 
D.  Familial DNA Searching Should be Authorized by Minnesota Statute 
Familial DNA searching should be conducted in Minnesota at the 
state level through statutory authorization, whether implicitly through 
existing DNA database legislation or explicitly through new legislation 
specific to familial DNA.397 Authorizing familial DNA searching through an 
explicit statute would enable state funding to be directly allocated to 
laboratories for this purpose. 398  Furthermore, an explicit statute would 
                                                 
389 See supra text accompanying notes 133, 134 (detailing the success rates of 
familial DNA searching in different size databases based on relative ranking). 
390 See supra text accompanying note 136 (noting that most traditional DNA hits 
occur at the state level). 
391 See supra text accompanying note 114 (describing the five principles that form 
the basis of the U.K. familial DNA searching program). 
392 See supra notes 242, 251 (referencing the familial DNA searching bills 
proposed in Minnesota and New York). 
393 See supra text accompanying note 167 (emphasizing Justice Sotomayor’s 
concern with new technology without oversight). 
394 See supra text accompanying note 266 (noting that California’s policy was 
promulgated by the attorney general). 
395 See supra text accompanying note 276 (suggesting that in order for a familial 
searching program to be effective, close communication between agencies is critical). 
396 See supra text accompanying note 125 (noting the SWGDAM recommended 
that familial DNA searching not be conducted at the national level due to logistical concerns). 
397 See supra Parts IV.A–B (describing the current DNA database statutes and the 
proposed familial DNA searching statutes). 
398 See supra text accompanying note 249 (detailing the fiscal note associated with 
the Minnesota familial DNA searching bill). 
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facilitate public debate.399 Due to the many misconceptions that surround 
familial DNA searching, public debate would provide important 
opportunities for clarification and reassurance about the process.400 
The current statutory landscape for familial DNA searching is 
barren, but the question of why there are no statutes expressly authorizing 
familial DNA searching and why there are so few public state polices can be 
answered.401 Lack of advocacy on the part of legislators and reticence on the 
part of forensic laboratories are two key reasons. First, familial DNA 
searching has not benefitted from strong legislative advocacy because most 
politicians and attorneys do not have an understanding of DNA principles 
and processes that enables them to argue knowledgably on the subject.402 
Second, many forensic science laboratories do not want to take on the added 
work that familial DNA searching will necessitate, because done properly, it 
is a resource-heavy endeavor.403 In addition, forensic science laboratories 
might be unwilling to assume the liability and unknown legal consequences 
of a state policy without statutory authorization.404 Familial DNA searching 
thus suffers from a problem often encountered in forensic science disciplines 
due to the combination of a technologically sophisticated scientific process 
with highly complex legal doctrines.405 When science is combined with the 
law, there are few that are experts in both aspects, and the successful 
implementation of innovative forensic techniques requires inter-agency 
cooperation and education.406 
1.  Familial DNA Searching May Implicitly Fall Under the Original 
Minnesota DNA Database Statutes 
Familial DNA searching may already be authorized implicitly under 
Minnesota’s current DNA database statute. The text of the Minnesota statute 
on DNA databases is arguably broad enough to allow for familial DNA 
                                                 
399 See supra text accompanying note 260 (providing that legislative action fosters 
public debate). 
400 See supra text accompanying note 216 (noting the policy arguments that have 
been made regarding familial DNA searching). 
401 See supra Part IV.B and Part IV.C (describing the failure of familial DNA bills 
passing and the limited number of official state policies). 
402 See supra text accompanying notes 250, 256 (noting that familial DNA bills 
are being forwarded to committees without further action). 
403 See supra Part II.B.4 (describing the steps involved in conducting and refining 
a familial DNA search). 
404 See supra Part IV.C (noting the limited number of familial DNA searching 
state policies). 
405 See supra Part II (describing the scientific basis of familial DNA searching) 
and Part II (explaining Fourth Amendment issues with familial DNA searching, including 
reasonable expectation of privacy and standing) 
406 See supra text accompanying note 276 (suggesting that in order for a familial 
searching program to be effective, close communication between agencies is critical). 
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searching. 407  In fact, any “searching” of the DNA database constitutes 
“cross-referencing.”408 The statute is silent with regard to the different levels 
of databases, match criteria, searching algorithms, or mixtures.409 By not 
defining database use with any specificity, the legislation necessarily 
transfers discretion to the administrator of the database to determine its 
applicable uses. 410  The legislature presumably intended for the statute to 
develop as DNA technology developed. Indeed, many of the decisions 
regarding familial DNA searching in Minnesota are the responsibility of 
forensic science laboratories.411 As the DNA database statute’s main purpose 
was to help identify individuals who committed crimes, familial DNA 
searching is a derivative use of an already established DNA database that 
was held constitutional by the Supreme Court.412 
The use of DNA databases in ways that likely were not contemplated 
when the DNA database statutes were created is not a new practice.413 When 
CODIS was implemented, DNA mixtures were not commonplace and were 
not entered into the database or searched.414 However, as the forensic science 
community realized the value of DNA mixtures in solving crimes, they 
adapted the use of the databases to include the possibility of not only 
searching, but uploading mixtures to NDIS. 415  Searching DNA mixtures 
“moderately” at NDIS can produce similar results with consequences similar 
to familial DNA searching.416 Searching DNA mixtures can produce false 
associations.417 Without the proper training and interpretation of those results 
by scientists, investigations may mistakenly focus attention on a suspect who 
                                                 
407 See supra text accompanying notes 229–230 (noting the broad and vague text 
of the Minnesota DNA database statute). 
408 See supra text accompanying note 227 (pointing out that the Minnesota statute 
allows for cross-referencing of data). 
409 See supra text accompanying notes 229–231 (discussing the scope of the 
Minnesota DNA database statute). 
410 See supra text accompanying note 230 (showing that the statute leaves 
discretion for the “bureau” to establish and operate the database). 
411 See supra text accompanying note 81 (discussing the Minnesota case that 
utilized familial DNA searching). 
412 See supra text accompanying note 226 (noting that the DNA Identification Act 
of 1994 was designed for identification purposes). 
413 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining searching of DNA 
mixtures in databases and defining DNA mixtures). 
414 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing DNA mixtures). 
415 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing types of samples that 
may be uploaded to NDIS). 
416 See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the distinction between deliberate familial 
DNA searching and fortuitous partial matches which can both be made through a moderate 
search). 
417 See supra text accompanying note 84 (stating that every time a moderate 
search is conducted, a partial match may be obtained). 
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was not involved in the crime.418 Yet forensic science laboratories have not 
experienced the same opposition to searching mixtures in the database as 
they have with familial DNA searching.419 Most likely because searching 
mixtures did not require coining a term, laboratories just began to practice 
the method from a scientific basis.420 
Similarly, even though identifying partial matches from DNA 
database searches was not an original use of DNA databases, it has become a 
prevailing practice in both state and national laboratories. 421  The FBI’s 
formal statement on partial matches implies that because the match occurs 
spontaneously, without intention, the implications and associations are 
somehow different from familial DNA searching.422 The FBI’s contradiction 
and focus on intention is problematic. Deliberate familial DNA searching is 
not conducted at the national level, yet the FBI facilitates sharing 
information if the association is made fortuitously.423 Concerns with familial 
DNA searching do not focus on the actual searching component, but rather 
on the downstream sharing of information and the theoretical expansion of 
the database.424 Whether the search is deliberate or fortuitous, the results of 
that search are the same.425 
Finally, the makeup of the databases has expanded beyond the scope 
of what state and federal statutes originally dictated. The initial crimes 
requiring DNA sample submission were limited to homicide and sexual 
assaults.426 In time, the type of crime requiring sample submission expanded 
to all felonies in a number of states.427 Many states now require individuals 
arrested of crimes to submit a DNA sample to the database. 428  This 
expansion through statutory authorization sheds light on the desired use of 
                                                 
418 See supra text accompanying note 274 (describing how Colorado’s familial 
DNA searching program requires additional training of instigators to understand the 
associations that are made with partial matches). 
419 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing types of samples that are 
routinely be uploaded to NDIS). 
420 See supra text accompanying note 65 (noting that moderate stringency searches 
were implemented to search DNA mixtures). See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
421 See supra notes 82, 83 and accompanying text (pointing out that the FBI 
facilitates partial match searching between states). 
422 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (making the distinction between 
intentional searches and unintentional matches). 
423 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
424 See supra text accompanying note 260 (noting concerns from the Innocence 
Project including expansion of the databases and the negative collateral effects of familial 
DNA searching). 
425 See supra Part II.B.3 (describing deliberate and fortuitous searching). 
426 See supra note 232. 
427 See supra note 233. 
428 See supra text accompanying note 210 (noting that 28 states and the federal 
government have statutes authorizing the collection of DNA samples from individuals arrested 
for certain crimes). 
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DNA databases and the legislature’s approach to DNA’s role in identifying 
perpetrators of crime.429 
2.  Explicit Statutory Authorization Versus Administrative Policies 
Explicit statutory authorization of familial DNA searching would 
serve two main purposes. First, it would force public discussion and foster 
debate. 430  This discussion and debate would ideally lead to a better 
understanding of the process by attorneys, legislatures, and the public.431 
Familial DNA searching is not necessarily an endeavor that scientists should 
be taking on by themselves.432 Forensic scientists do not fully appreciate the 
legal consequences, specifically with regard to establishing procedures that 
will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 433  Second, explicit statutory 
authorization would relieve some of the uncertainty that scientists have 
regarding the legality of familial DNA searching.434 The hesitancy to adopt 
this type of database searching is apparent by the inadequate use of familial 
DNA searching throughout the United States.435 
However, explicit statutory authorization may be difficult to 
implement. The repeated introduction of bills in both Minnesota and New 
York are evidence of the failures of both states to pass familial DNA 
legislation.436 While the Minnesota bill was vague, the detail of the New 
York bill was similar to the California attorney general policy in many 
respects.437 Both made the important differentiation between partial matches 
and familial DNA searching and required the use of YSTR testing to further 
refine the results of the searches.438 Most importantly, both the New York 
bill and the California policy involved the oversight of a multi-disciplinary 
                                                 
429 See supra text accompanying note 210 (noting that 28 states and the federal 
government have statutes authorizing the collection of DNA samples from individuals arrested 
for certain crimes). 
430 See supra text accompanying note 260 (providing that legislative action fosters 
public debate). 
431 See supra Part II (discussing the complex scientific background of familial 
DNA searching). 
432 See supra Part III (discussing the numerous Fourth Amendment concerns 
surrounding familial DNA searching). 
433 See supra Part III (discussing the numerous Fourth Amendment concerns 
surrounding familial DNA searching). 
434 See supra Part IV.C (noting the few state policies that exist regarding familial 
DNA searching). 
435 See supra Part IV (noting the lack of legislation regarding familial DNA 
searching and the few state policies in place). 
436 See supra text accompanying notes 250, 257 (pointing out that both Minnesota 
and New York bills were reintroduced for a second session of the legislature). 
437 See supra text accompanying note 252 (noting the detail in the New York bill). 
438 See supra text accompanying notes 252, 255, 266, 269 (outlining the details of 
the New York bill and California policy regarding partial matches and YSTR testing). 
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committee. 439  Whether through explicit statutory authorization or 
administrative policy, this cooperation between law enforcement, scientists, 
and legal professionals is paramount to implementing a successful familial 
DNA searching program. 
3.  The Rulemaking Process and Procedures Should be Transparent 
States must take action to implement familial DNA searching 
policies. While the legal community debates the constitutionality of familial 
DNA searching, labs across the country perform these searches ad hoc 
without transparency or accountability. 440  This is problematic for two 
reasons. First, familial DNA searching procedures should involve a written, 
detailed, multi-step process to protect privacy rights and limit false 
associations. 441  Lack of written procedures and policies for a complex 
process such as familial DNA searching invites reckless and careless actions 
with undesirable consequences.442 Second, undocumented procedures are not 
subject to public or legal scrutiny. Any robust state policy must be subjected 
to both scientific and legal scrutiny.443 Furthermore, when a law enforcement 
technique appears clandestine, the reasonable response from the legal 
community is suspicion.444 Because laboratories are proceeding with familial 
DNA searching in absence of either statutory authorization or procedures 
made open to the public, society assumes something untoward is 
occurring.445 On the contrary, familial DNA searching is constitutional and 
based on sound scientific principles.446 In order for the familial DNA storm 
to subside, laboratories and law enforcement must be transparent and 
forthright about their policies and procedures. 
The lack of understanding the distinction between deliberate familial 
searching and fortuitous partial matches allows laboratories to veil their 
                                                 
439 See supra text accompanying notes 253, 270 (describing the committees 
involved in both the New York bill and the California policy). 
440 See Ram, supra note 68, at 777 (“Of the forty-one responding jurisdictions that 
have some policy or practice regarding partial matches, at least eighteen have left these 
policies unwritten.”); supra text accompanying note 109 (noting that Minnesota performs 
familial DNA testing while hiding under the “new technique” language). 
441 See supra Part II.B.4 (describing the extensive process of performing a familial 
DNA search, evaluating the association, and refining the ranking list). 
442 See supra text accompanying notes 79–80 (explaining how states use language 
to proceed surreptitiously). 
443 See supra text accompanying note 245 (noting that a main concern with the 
Minnesota bill was lack of public debate regarding the rulemaking). 
444 See supra text accompany note 166 (mentioning the community hostility that 
can accompany new law enforcement techniques that evade the checks to constrain abusive 
police practices). 
445 See supra text accompanying note 216 (noting the policy arguments that have 
been made regarding familial DNA searching). 
446 See supra Part II (describing the scientific foundation for familial DNA 
searching). 
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practices in ambiguous terminology.447 A recent law enforcement case is a 
clear example of this lack of transparency.448 Investigators solved a 1981 
cold case homicide with the use of familial DNA searching, but the public 
was only informed that the match was made due to “new technology.”449 The 
reason for the mischaracterization is likely two-fold: the laboratory does not 
have an official policy regarding familial DNA searching and the laboratory 
was afraid of the political fall-out if they used the term “familial DNA 
searching.”450 This case exemplifies the issues surrounding familial DNA 
searching.451 Minnesota is conducting familial DNA searching, but has no 
public authorization or policy.452 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The complex interplay of technicalities and constitutional 
considerations has made familial DNA searching the black sheep of the 
forensic DNA family. 453  Both the scientific and legal communities, 
independently, are not confident in how to proceed and implement this 
methodology effectively.454 However, the recent Supreme Court decisions 
addressing not only advanced technologies, but DNA testing specifically, 
will hopefully bridge some of this gap between science and the law.455 
Familial DNA searching should be implemented in Minnesota through 
statutory authorization, whether implicitly through the already existing DNA 
database legislation or explicitly through new legislation specific to familial 
DNA.456 Regardless of the method of implementation, it is imperative that 
laboratories and agencies are forthright and transparent about their 
procedures. 457  This openness will foster public debate and, hopefully, 
                                                 
447 See supra Part II.B.3 (describing deliberate and fortuitous searching). 
448 See supra note 81. 
449 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing how familial DNA 
searching is being conducted in Minnesota without transparency). 
450 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
451 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra Part IV (noting the lack of legislation and state policy in Minnesota 
regarding familial DNA searching). 
453 See supra Parts II–III (discussing the scientific background and Fourth 
Amendment considerations of familial DNA searching). 
454 See supra Part IV (noting the lack of legislation regarding familial DNA 
searching and the few state policies in place). 
455 See supra Part III (discussing the recent Supreme Court cases and their 
implications for familial DNA searching). 
456 See supra Part IV (discussing the different approaches for state implementation 
of a familial DNA searching program). 
457 See supra text accompanying notes 166–167 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s 
concerns about discrete law enforcement practices operating in the absence of oversight from 
a coordinate branch of government). See supra text accompany note 166 (mentioning the 
community hostility that can accompany new law enforcement techniques that evade the 
checks to constrain abusive police practices). 
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continued education and understanding regarding this important investigative 
tool. 
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